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Abstract
How do geographic frictions affect firm organization? We show theoreti-
cally and empirically that geographic frictions increase the use of middle man-
agers in multi-establishment firms. In our model, we assume that a CEO’s
time is a resource in limited supply, shared across headquarters and establish-
ments. Geographic frictions increase the costs of accessing the CEO. Hiring
middle managers at one establishment substitutes for CEO time, which is
reallocated across all establishments. Consequently, geographic frictions be-
tween the headquarters and one establishment affect the organization of all
establishments of a firm. Our model is consistent with novel facts about multi-
establishment firm organization that we document using administrative data
from Germany. We exploit the opening of high-speed train routes to show that
not only the establishments directly affected by faster travel times but also
the other establishments of the firm adjust their organization. Our findings
imply that local conditions propagate across space through firm organization.
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1 Introduction
Large firms often organize their employees in multiple establishments in differ-
ent locations. Geographic frictions such as long travel times to the headquarters
adversely affect establishment performance within multi-establishment firms (e.g.,
Giroud, 2013; Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2013). Anecdotal evidence suggests that ad-
justing the managerial organization may help firms mitigate the negative impacts
of geographic frictions. For example, employing middle managers at regional offices
instead of the headquarters proved a key ingredient for the success of Singer Sewing
Machine Company in the US (Chandler, 2002, 403-5). Philips employed dedicated
country managers and regional executives as part of a larger strategy to revitalize
their operations in the 1990s (Nueno and Ghemawat, 2002). Moreover, when the
Canadian firm Blinds To Go set up a plant in New Jersey in 1998, moving an expe-
rienced manager on site improved its production efficiency (Menor and Mark, 2001).
Nevertheless, to date, there is no theoretical work and very little empirical evidence
on the impact of geographic frictions on the managerial organization of firms.
This paper studies the managerial organization of firms with multiple establish-
ments. We show empirically and theoretically that geographic frictions increase the
use of middle managers in multi-establishment firms. We use a new data set from
administrative sources in Germany to document that multi-establishment firms with
more distant establishments employ greater numbers of employees in managerial oc-
cupations. In our model, geographic frictions increase the optimal number of man-
agerial layers of multi-establishment firms and affect the optimal organization of the
distant establishment. Importantly, the organizational adjustments at the establish-
ment have repercussions for the organization of the headquarters. Hence, the model
predicts that geographic frictions between the headquarters and one establishment
affect the optimal managerial organization of the headquarters and other potential
establishments of a multi-establishment firm. We use our data to show that this
prediction is reflected in the organizational response of multi-establishment firms to
a reduction in travel times following the opening of high-speed train routes.
A key implication of our study is that the managerial organization of firms
with multiple establishments is interdependent across establishments. This implies
that local economic conditions affect not only the local establishment, but also
the headquarters and other establishments of a multi-establishment firm. Local
conditions thus propagate across space through firm organization.
We motivate our study by documenting three facts about multi-establishment
firm organization. Our data set is ideally suited to the study of multi-establishment
firms because it combines detailed information about their establishments’ employees
and locations. The facts suggest that geographic frictions affect the location and
organization of multi-establishment firms.
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First, the probability that a firm operates an establishment at a particular lo-
cation decreases with distance from the headquarters. Distance from headquarters
also correlates negatively with the size of the establishments.
Second, the number of managerial layers of a multi-establishment firm correlates
positively with the distance of its establishments from the headquarters. Quanti-
tatively, doubling the distance is associated with the same increase in number of
layers as increasing sales by 14 percent. The correlation is not driven by larger firms
investing in more distant locations, or other firm characteristics. Distance correlates
positively with the number of managerial layers both at the establishments and the
headquarters.
Third, multi-establishment firms typically add or drop managerial layers either
at the headquarters or the establishments. Only rarely do they alter the number
of layers at both the headquarters and establishments simultaneously. This pattern
is similar across firms with few and many establishments, and firms with close and
distant establishments.
We propose a model to understand how geographic frictions affect the optimal
managerial organization of firms. We model firms as knowledge hierarchies (e.g.,
Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012; Garicano, 2000). We select this framework
because recent evidence suggests that distance impedes knowledge flows both within
firm sites and across firms (e.g., Liu, 2010; Lychagin et al., 2016), and that the
efficient transfer of intangible inputs such as managerial knowledge is an important
motive for integrating multiple establishments (Atalay et al., 2014). We assume
that a firm consists of a headquarters and possibly an additional establishment.
The production workers at the headquarters and the establishment share a chief
executive officer (CEO), who is located at the headquarters and helps workers solve
the problems that arise during production. Production is a problem-solving process.
Workers input labor and generate problems that must be solved using their or the
CEO’s knowledge in order to generate output. The firm may choose to hire a layer
of local middle managers, who solve some of the problems that would otherwise need
to be solved by the CEO, but entail a quasi-fixed cost for the firm.
Helping workers costs CEO time. The driving forces behind the theoretical
results are that the CEO has only one unit of time, and that geographic frictions
between the establishment and the headquarters increase the amount of time that
the CEO needs to help the workers at the distant establishment.
Through straining CEO time, geographic frictions reduce the probability that a
firm operates an establishment. For the same reason, establishments are typically
smaller than the headquarters. This result is consistent with the lower investment
probability at distant locations and the lower size of distant establishments docu-
mented in Fact 1.
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Through limited CEO time, geographic frictions affect the organization of both
the establishment and the headquarters. The firm adjusts the establishment’s or-
ganization in response to more severe geographic frictions so that fewer problems
need to be solved by the CEO. In particular, geographic frictions render it desirable
to hire middle managers. Given that the CEO is shared between the headquar-
ters and the establishment, the firm additionally adjusts the organization at the
headquarters. The model thus explains Fact 2: the number of layers increases with
geographic frictions, and the organization responds both at the establishments and
the headquarters.
As the middle managers entail a quasi-fixed cost, a firm only hires them if firm
size is sufficiently large. Importantly, hiring middle managers at the establishment
also increases efficiency at the headquarters (and vice versa). This is because middle
managers release CEO time, hence middle managers at the establishment increase
the amount of CEO time available for the headquarters. As a result, they reduce the
need to hire middle managers at the headquarters. This result explains Fact 3: multi-
establishment firms do not add layers at the headquarters and the establishments
at the same time. Both the successive reorganization and the impact of geographic
frictions reflect how multi-establishment firm organization is interdependent across
establishments.
In the final part of our paper, we utilize the opening of high-speed train routes
in Germany to study the response of firm organization to exogenous variation in
geographic frictions. The train routes reduce travel time between establishments
and headquarters, providing the quickest mode of travel between locations: they are
faster than cars, as well as planes once one accounts for waiting times at the airport.
We focus on the model prediction that geographic frictions between the headquarters
and one establishment have repercussions for the organization of the headquarters
and other potential establishments of the firm. Importantly, geographic frictions
affect establishment size in the model. Size changes lead to changes in the number of
layers. Travel times therefore have an indirect effect through size on the managerial
organization, in addition to their direct effect. Only the total—direct and indirect—
effect of lower travel times is identified.
We find that establishments that benefit from lower travel times grow faster
than those that do not. The number of managerial layers does not change. This
is consistent with the direct negative effect of lower travel times on the number of
layers and the indirect positive effect through larger size compensating each other.
Importantly, we find that lower travel times increase the number of managerial
layers at the headquarters even though headquarter size does not change. This
finding supports the interdependence of the managerial organization predicted by
the model. The interdependence goes beyond the headquarters: if a firm has both
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an establishment affected and one unaffected by lower travel times, the share of
employees in managerial occupations in the unaffected establishment increases faster
than in establishments of firms that do not benefit at all from lower travel times.
Through the lens of the model, lower travel times between the headquarters and
the establishment affect the managerial organization because they decrease the costs
of the CEO helping the employees at the establishment. We exploit the model’s
implication that changes in the helping costs have a more pronounced impact in
sectors with a less predictable production process to explore this channel. We find
that the estimated effects are driven by establishments and headquarters in sectors
with below-median predictability of the production process. This evidence supports
the helping cost channel proposed by the model.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. The key result of the
paper is that geographic frictions are an important determinant of the managerial
organization of firms. To develop this result theoretically, we build on the literature
of firms as knowledge hierarchies (for an overview, see Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg,
2015). Our paper is closest to that of Antra`s et al. (2008), which shows that middle
managers facilitate the transmission of knowledge across countries in the context
of offshoring. Our model goes beyond their theory by incorporating simultaneous
production at the headquarters and the establishment of a firm. This enables us
to study the effect of local shocks on the managerial organization of not only the
local but also the non-local units of a firm. The broader literature on knowledge
hierarchies focuses on size as a determinant of organization and shows that adding
a layer of middle managers allows firms to increase efficiency as they grow (e.g.,
Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012; Caliendo et al., 2015a, 2015b; Friedrich, 2016).1
In contrast, the possibility of multi-establishment production is largely neglected,
even though multi-establishment firms account for a substantial share of aggregate
employment in developed economies.2
The key implication of the paper is that multi-establishment firm organization
is interdependent across establishments. This insight is particularly relevant for re-
cent literature documenting how multi-establishment firms propagate local shocks
through their internal networks (Giroud and Mueller, 2017; Seetharam, 2018). This
1Similar predictions result from a monitoring hierarchy framework (e.g., Chen, 2017; Chen and
Suen, 2017). Mariscal (2018) demonstrates that the impact of new information technologies on firm
organization explains the decline of the US labor share using a knowledge hierarchy framework.
Sforza (2017) studies the organizational responses of firms to a credit supply shock. Spanos (2018)
shows that variation in firm organization explains some of the productivity differences across local
markets. In the empirical literature on firm hierarchies, Rajan and Wulf (2006) document the
flattening of corporate hierarchies over time, and Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) examine the impact
of competition on corporate hierarchies using detailed data on 300 large publicly traded US firms.
2Gumpert (2018) develops a knowledge hierarchy model with multiple establishments, but a
fixed number of layers. Cre`mer et al. (2007) study firm language in a setting with multiple di-
visions. McElheran (2014) presents facts about the allocation of decision-making authority in
multi-establishment firms based on team-theoretic considerations.
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body of research discusses managerial and financial constraints as potential drivers
of the empirical findings. However, although CEOs are considered an important
determinant of firm performance (see Bertrand, 2009, for a survey), to date man-
agerial constraints have received very little systematic attention. Our contribution
is to provide both a formal analysis and empirical evidence regarding the role of
managerial constraints for multi-establishment firm organization.
Our empirical strategy builds on literature using the introduction of high-speed
train routes to identify the impact of reductions in geographic frictions on firm
outcomes (e.g., Bernard et al., 2017). Our empirical approach is particularly close
to Charnoz et al. (2018), who to our knowledge, provide the only purely empirical
study of the impact of geographic frictions on firm organization. Our theoretical
model demonstrates why the impact of geographic frictions goes beyond a particular
establishment, as also found by Charnoz et al. (2018), and cleanly disentangles the
direct effects of geographic frictions on firm organization and the indirect effects
through size. While they study business groups, our empirical analysis focuses on
multi-establishment firms, i.e., the establishments are not legally independent units.
The interdependence of establishment organization is also relevant for the litera-
ture on multinational firms. In this literature, headquarter inputs are often consid-
ered public goods within the firm (e.g., Helpman et al., 2004; Irarrazabal et al., 2013;
Antra`s and Yeaple, 2014, for a survey). Our results caution that this assumption
may apply to patents or trademarks, but not necessarily to managerial inputs.
Finally, our paper offers a novel perspective on the recent management litera-
ture. Bloom et al. (2016) document that half of the total variation in management
practices between different US establishments owes to variations between establish-
ments within the same firm. Implementing managerial practices requires managerial
time. The heterogeneity of management practices in multi-establishment firms may
reflect asymmetries in the number of layers of middle managers and the amount of
CEO time allocated to an establishment.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
presents the facts on multi-establishment firm organization. Section 4 develops the
model. Section 5 presents the evidence from the opening of high-speed train routes.
The final section concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Data sources
We use a detailed, linked firm-establishment-employee data set for Germany that
is uniquely suited to the study of multi-establishment firms. The data contain
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information on the sales and legal form of firms, as well as location at the county level
and the sector of their establishments.3 We observe all employees per establishment
subject to social security contributions on 30 June. The data include the occupation,
level of education, and wages of each employee. The data cover firms in all sectors
during the period 2000–2012. Each employee, establishment and firm has a unique
identifier that makes it possible to follow them over time.
We assemble the data set from two sources. The universe of social security
records provides the data on employees and establishments. The Research Data
Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for
Employment Research (IAB) makes these data available for research. We use the
employee history, the Establishment History Panel and the extension files on entries
and exits of establishments.4 The Orbis database of Bureau van Dijk (BvD) contains
the balance sheet information of firms. We combine the social security records and
the Orbis database using record linkage techniques. The algorithm exploits the
regulation that the establishment names in the social security data must contain
the firm name. The headquarters (HQ) of a firm is identified as the establishment
with the same zip code or locality as the firm.5 Appendix A.1 contains details on
the components of our data set and the record linkage procedure.
The data set is an unbalanced panel. We use the year 2012 for cross-sectional
analyses, because it contains the maximum number of establishments. The panel
analyses use the period 2000–2010. We exclude the year 2011 due to changes in
occupational classification in that year (see Appendix A.2). Consistent with the
literature, we restrict our sample to full-time employees (e.g., Card et al., 2013;
Dustmann et al., 2009). We focus on firms with at least 10 employees in all years.
99 percent of the firms dropped due to this requirement have only one establishment.
Multi-establishment (ME) firms comprise the headquarter establishment and at
least one additional establishment. For clarity, we use the term “headquarters” for
the headquarter establishment and “establishment” to denote other establishments
of the firm. Single-establishment (SE) firms only consist of the headquarters.
2.2 Measures for managerial organization
We use the occupation of the employees to construct three measures of the man-
agerial organization of firms. Our preferred measure is the number of managerial
layers. We assign employees to four layers (following Caliendo et al., 2015b):
3German counties are roughly comparable to counties in the US.
4The establishment identifier in the Establishment History Panel may change when ownership
changes. The extension files render it possible to follow the establishments nonetheless.
5The social security data contain the address of an establishment. We are not allowed to use
the address for our analyses due to data confidentiality.
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Level Designation Occupations
3 CEO CEOs, managing directors
2 Middle managers Senior experts, middle managers
1 Supervisors Supervisors, engineers, technicians, professionals
0 Production workers Clerks, operators, production workers
We transfer the mapping in Caliendo et al. (2015b) based on the French classifica-
tion of occupations to the German classification using official correspondence tables;
Friedrich (2016) uses an analogous procedure for Danish data. We treat the layer at
the lowest level in the firm as non-managerial. We count the number of layers above
the lowest layer per firm. The lowest layer contains employees at level 0 in 98 per-
cent of firms. Throughout the paper, we document that our findings are robust to
treating the lowest level in each establishment as non-managerial. Appendix A.3
provides details on our procedure and a list of occupations by level.
Alternatively, we use shares of managerial occupations in the wage sum. The
establishments report the occupations of employees in the social security data. In
multi-establishment firms, establishments may assign different occupations to sim-
ilar employees. Cross-checking the results regarding the number of layers with the
managerial share ensures that our results are robust to this possibility. We deter-
mine managerial occupations in two ways. On the one hand, we use the assignment
of employees to layers and treat all employees above the lowest level as managerial.
On the other hand, we use the Blossfeld (1983, 1987) occupational categories (see
Appendix A.3 for the list of managerial occupations), which build on research from
sociology and are part of the Establishment History Panel. Managers are employees
in occupations that have decision-making power over the use of production factors
as well as high-level officials in organizations (Blossfeld, 1983, 208). Given that
German social security data do not contain the number of hours worked, and wages
are censored at the social security limit, it is difficult to use other measures that are
common in the literature such as the span of managerial control or wages per layer.
Appendix A.4 illustrates the plausibility of the assignment of employees to layers.
We show that employees at higher layers earn higher wages and have greater levels
of education in the social security data. Further, we highlight how the tasks of
employees systematically differ between layers in ways that plausibly reflect the
different roles of employees within firms using additional survey data.
2.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the 2012 cross-section. Our sample com-
prises 109,000 firms. We only observe sales for the larger firms owing to missing
values in the Orbis data. The firms consist of 144,000 establishments (including
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, SE vs. ME firms, 2012 cross section
Units of observation N % share ME firms
Firms 109,357 9.0
with non-missing sales 57,811 9.1
Establishments 144,437 31.1
Employees 6,356,072 34.2
Descriptive statistics N ME Mean SD p25 p50 p75 p95
# employees 99,545 0 42 92 13 21 39 133
9,812 1 222 1980 22 50 127 650
Sales (M e) 52,524 0 28 694 2 4 9 67
5,287 1 358 4,111 4 15 74 608
Descriptive statistics. ME: indicator for multi-establishment firm; # employees: number of full-
time employees; Sales (M e): sales in million e.
headquarters) and employ 6.4 million individuals. The data cover almost one third
of total full-time employment subject to social security contributions in Germany
as of December 2012 (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, 2016).
Nine percent of firms are multi-establishment firms. They make up a dispro-
portionate share of establishments and employment: 31 percent of establishments
belong to them, and 34 percent of employees work for them. This pattern is similar
across sectors. In manufacturing—the sector with the highest number of firms—
multi-establishment firms account for seven percent of firms, but 39 percent of em-
ployment. In retail and wholesale—the second largest sector—the share of multi-
establishment firms is 12 percent, but their share in employment is 33 percent. On
average across sectors, the share of multi-establishment firms in establishments and
employment is three times their share in the number of firms.6
The statistics in the lower panel reflect the relevance of multi-establishment firms.
These are substantially larger than single-establishment firms in terms of employ-
ment and sales. The median multi-establishment firm employs more than twice as
many employees as the median single-establishment firm; at the 95th percentile,
the factor is five. Median sales of multi-establishment firms are four times those of
single-establishment firms.
Table 2 illustrates the complexity of multi-establishment firms. On average,
multi-establishment firms have five establishments (including headquarters). Half
of them have two, and the largest five percent have 10 or more establishments
(including headquarters). Multi-establishment firms are active in two sectors on
average. The establishments tend to be geographically dispersed. Half of the multi-
establishment firms only have establishments located within 170 km of their head-
quarters. At the top of the distribution, the distance between headquarters and
6The share of multi-establishment firms in the number of firms (employment) ranges from
4 (11) percent in construction (agriculture) to 16 (60) percent in mining and quarrying.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics, ME firms, 2012 cross section
Descriptive statistics, firm N Mean SD p50 p75 p95
# establishments (incl. HQ) 9,812 4.6 19.6 2 3 10
# sectors 9,812 1.6 0.9 1 2 3
Maximum distance to HQ, km 9,812 218 189 167 376 547
Minimum area covered, km2 3,579 30,117 41,725 7,025 49,915 125,253
Descriptive statistics, est. N HQ Mean SD p25 p50 p75
# employees 35,080 0 32 333 2 5 16
9,812 1 107 669 11 27 76
# managerial layers 35,080 0 1.0 0.8 0 1 2
9,812 1 1.7 1.1 1 2 3
Managerial share 35,080 0 37 38 0 24 70
(%, layers) 9,812 1 38 32 11 32 64
Managerial share 35,080 0 8 19 0 0 5
(%, Blossfeld) 9,812 1 10 16 0 4 14
Descriptive statistics, ME firms. # establishments (incl. HQ): number of establishments (in-
cluding headquarters); # sectors: number of three-digit sectors; Maximum distance to HQ, km:
maximum distance between establishment and headquarters in kilometers; Minimum area cov-
ered, km2: minimum area covered by establishments and headquarters in square-kilometers; HQ:
indicator for headquarters; # employees: number of full-time employees; # managerial layers:
number of managerial layers; Managerial share (%, layers/Blossfeld): share of wage sum earned
by employees in managerial occupations (according to layers/Blossfeld occupational categories).
establishments exceeds 540 km, about two thirds of the maximum possible distance
within Germany. The distribution of the minimum area covered by firms with at
least two establishments in addition to the headquarters is also skewed.
The lower panel of Table 2 illustrates differences between the headquarters and
other establishments. Headquarters are substantially larger than other establish-
ments. The median headquarters is even larger than the median single-establishment
firm. The size of establishments varies with a larger standard deviation than that
for single-establishment firms. This only partly reflects that the cut-off of at least
10 employees is not binding at the establishment level. Management is concentrated
in the headquarters: Headquarters have a higher number of managerial layers at all
quartiles of the distribution, and a higher management share than establishments.
3 Facts
This section describes the geographic and managerial organization of multi-establish-
ment firms. We first describe how geographic frictions between a location and the
headquarters affect the location decision and size of establishments. Taking the
establishment locations as given, we then describe the managerial organization in
the cross section and over time.
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Table 3: Location probability and establishment size, ME firms, 2012 cross section
Dependent variable Location probability Log # est. employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log distance to HQ −0.315∗∗∗ −0.303∗∗∗ −0.368∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017)
Log market potential 0.745∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.031) (0.044) (0.046)
Relative wages −0.942∗∗∗ −0.887∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗ −0.433∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.063) (0.108) (0.109)
Relative land prices −0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
# observations 3,715,666 3,222,108 3,715,666 21,496 19,203 21,496
# firms 9,266 8,732 9,266 3,006 2,773 3,006
HQ sector FE Y Y Y N N N
HQ county FE Y Y Y N N N
Legal form FE Y Y Y N N N
County FE N N Y N N Y
Firm FE N N N Y Y Y
Model Probit OLS
The table presents the coefficient estimates of a Probit model (constant included; standard errors
clustered by HQ county in parentheses) in columns 1-3 and a linear model (standard errors clustered
by firm and county in parentheses) in columns 4-6. ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable:
(1)-(3): indicator, one if firm i owns at least one establishment in county c, (4)-(6): log number of
employees of establishment(s) in county c. Independent variables: Log distance to HQ: log distance
between county c and HQ county of firm i in km; Log market potential: log of distance weighted
average of the GDP of county c and surrounding counties; Relative wages/land prices: average
wages/land prices in county c relative to wages/land prices in HQ county of firm i. We compute
average wages in a county excluding firm i. Distance, market potential and relative land prices
are computed using data of the German Statistical Office. The number of firms is lower than the
number of ME firms due to missing values for the legal form. FE=fixed effects.
3.1 Distance to headquarters decreases location probability
Table 3 describes the geographic organization of multi-establishment firms. Columns
1 to 3 contain the results of Probit regressions that relate an indicator for whether a
multi-establishment firm maintains an establishment in a county with county char-
acteristics. Columns 4 to 6 contain OLS regressions that relate the log number of
employees of the establishment(s) in a county with county characteristics.7 The OLS
regressions control for firm fixed effects to account for firm heterogeneity, hence they
only include multi-establishment firms with establishments in at least two counties.
Firms are less likely to locate an establishment in a county that is more distant
from their headquarters. Establishment size also decreases with distance. Larger
market potential increases location probability and establishment size. Lower wages
and land prices in the county relative to the headquarters are positively associated
with location probability. Although lower wages also relate positively to establish-
ment size, lower land prices relate negatively.
7We aggregate the number of employees to the county level if a firm has several establishments.
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The results are consistent with a negative impact of geographic frictions between
the headquarters and an establishment on establishment performance. The effects
of market potential and relative wages indicate market-seeking and cost-cutting
motives for having establishments. The different effects of land prices on location
decision and size are in line with the cost of land being a fixed cost, so it is worth
maintaining only larger establishments at locations with higher land prices.
Fact 1 summarizes our findings:
Fact 1. Distance of a county from the headquarters is negatively related to the
probability that a multi-establishment firm locates an establishment in a county as
well as the size of the establishment conditional on location.
Appendix Table B.1 shows that the results are similar in the 2000–2010 panel.
3.2 Distance to headquarters increases the number of layers
Table 4 describes the relationship between geographic frictions and firm organization
as reflected by the number of managerial layers and managerial share in the wage
sum. For the number of managerial layers, we estimate Poisson regressions:
#managerial layersi = exp (β0 + β1geographic frictionsi + β2sizei + αl + αn + αs)
where i refers to the firm, l to its legal form, n to the county of the headquarters, s to
the headquarter sector, and α denotes fixed effects. To account for the fractional
nature of the managerial share, we follow Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and estimate
a generalized linear model using the same covariates.8 We approximate geographic
frictions with the maximum distance of an establishment to the headquarters as
well as the minimum area spanned by the establishments and the headquarters.
The distance is defined for all multi-establishment firms, whereas the area is only
defined for firms with establishments in at least two counties. We use sales and the
number of non-managerial employees as measures of firm size. Firm size controls
for the positive effect of size on the number of layers (e.g., Caliendo et al., 2015b)
and for the possibility of larger firms investing in more distant locations.
The regression results show that both distance and area have a positive impact on
the number of managerial layers in a firm. According to columns 1 and 3, doubling
the maximum distance of an establishment to the headquarters is associated with the
same increase in the number of layers as 14 percent higher sales or 19 percent more
non-managerial employees. Doubling the area is associated with the same change in
layers as increasing size by 30 percent according to columns 2 and 4. Accordingly,
the managerial share relates positively to both the distance and the area.
8We assume a logit link function and the binomial distributional family.
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Table 4: Regression results, managerial organization of ME firms, 2012 cross section
Dependent variable # managerial layers Managerial share ∈ [0, 1]
Layers Blossfeld
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Maximum log 0.017∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
distance to HQ (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.012)
Log area 0.025∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.013)
Log sales 0.118∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
Log # non-mg. 0.115∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
employees (0.004) (0.005)
# firms 5,111 1,661 9,275 2,768 9,275 2,768 9,275 2,768
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Legal form FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM
The table presents the coefficient estimates. Constant included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Even columns include only ME firms with
establishments in at least two counties. Dependent variable: (1)-(4) number of managerial layers, (5),(6) managerial share in wage sum, according to layers, (7),(8)
managerial share in wage sum, according to Blossfeld occupational categories. Independent variables: Maximum log distance to headquarters: log of maximum
distance between establishment and headquarters in km; Log area spanned by firm: log of minimum area covered by establishments and headquarters in square
kilometers; Log sales: log annual sales; Log # of non-mg. employees: log number of employees at lowest layer. The number of observations is lower than the
number of ME firms due to missing values for the legal form. FE = fixed effects, mg. = managerial.
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Table 5: Regression results, mg. organization of establishments, 2012 cross section
Unit Establishment Headquarters
Dependent variable # layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1] # layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1]
Layers Blossfeld Layers Blossfeld
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log distance 0.031∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗
to HQ (0.007) (0.020) (0.033)
Maximum log 0.042∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
distance to HQ (0.004) (0.010) (0.014)
Log # non-mg. 0.258∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
employees (0.010) (0.004)
# est./HQ 29,416 35,079 35,079 9,536 9,812 9,812
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM Poisson GLM
The table presents the coefficient estimates. Constant included. Standard errors in parentheses
(clustered by firm in columns 1 to 3, robust in columns 4 to 6). ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Dependent variable: (1),(4) number of managerial layers, (2),(5) managerial share in wage sum,
according to layers, (3),(6) managerial share in wage sum, according to Blossfeld occupational cate-
gories. Independent variables: Log distance to headquarters: log of distance between establishment
and headquarters in km; Maximum log distance to headquarters: log of maximum distance between
establishment and headquarters in km; Log # of non-mg. employees: log number of employees at
lowest layer in establishment/HQ. FE = fixed effects, mg. = managerial.
The firm-level results may disguise different responses of headquarter and estab-
lishment organization. As the descriptive statistics in Table 2 indicate, the manage-
rial organization of the establishments does not copy the headquarters. 71 percent of
establishments have fewer managerial layers than the headquarters. Table 5 comple-
ments the firm-level estimates with establishment and headquarter-level regressions.
Columns 1 to 3 refer to establishments and columns 4 to 6 refer to headquarters.
Similar to the firm-level results, the number of managerial layers and the man-
agerial share of an establishment increase if the establishment is located further
from the headquarters. The number of managerial layers and the managerial share
at the headquarters also respond positively to the distance of the headquarters from
the establishments. Quantitatively, doubling the (maximum) distance is equiva-
lent to increasing the number of non-managerial employees by 12 percent for the
establishments and 25 percent for the headquarters.
Fact 2 summarizes our findings:
Fact 2. The number of managerial layers and the managerial share of multi-estab-
lishment firms correlate positively with the distance between the headquarters and
the establishments and the area they span, conditional on firm characteristics. The
number of managerial layers and the managerial share of both the establishments
and the headquarters increase with distance.
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Robustness. Appendix B.2 documents that the results are robust. We first ex-
plore whether the results are robust to modifications to the main variables. Ta-
bles B.2 and B.3 replicate the analyses treating the lowest-level layer in each es-
tablishment as non-managerial. Tables B.4 and B.5 use dummies for the quartiles
of the (maximum) distance to headquarters. We find that the effect of distance
increases monotonically. Tables B.6 and B.7 include squared size, and Table B.8
includes the number of establishments as covariate. The results are robust, which
suggests that distance does not merely take up omitted non-linear effects of size on
the organization. In unreported regressions, we find that the results in Table 5 are
robust to including the age of the establishment as covariate, so a higher prevalence
of local managers in the set-up phase of an establishment does not drive the results.
Next, we assess the robustness to alternative econometric specifications. Ta-
bles B.9 and B.10 replicate the regression results using linear models. Table B.11
shows that distance affects the managerial organization of an establishment even
within firms: the number of layers and the managerial share of an establishment
increase with distance in linear regressions including firm fixed effects.
Finally, we show that the results are robust in additional data and sample splits.
Tables B.12 and B.13 show that the results are similar in the 2000–2010 data. Ta-
bles B.14 and B.15 show that the results are similar for firms that found establish-
ments for horizontal and vertical motives. We approximate motives using the sector:
establishments in the same sector as the headquarters are considered horizontal; es-
tablishments in a different sector are considered vertical. In unreported regressions,
we use the main non-managerial occupation as the criterion and obtain similar re-
sults. Tables B.16 and B.17 present the results by the legal form of the firm. The
legal form affects whether owner-managers have to contribute to social security and
are thus included in the data. Results are robust, except for public companies, for
which coefficients are mostly insignificant. This is unsurprising, given that there are
very few public companies in the sample and more than 90 percent of them have
two or three layers, hence there is little variation in their managerial organization.
3.3 Reorganization of headquarters or establishments
In order to complement the cross-sectional evidence on the determinants of man-
agerial organization, we study the reorganization dynamics of firms over time. The
upper panel of Table 6 displays the percentage share of multi-establishment firms
that transition from a number of managerial layers in year t to a potentially different
number of layers in year t+1. At least 80 percent of firms keep the number of layers
constant across periods. If they alter the number of layers, firms add or drop one
layer. These dynamics are similar to those of French and Danish firms (Caliendo
et al., 2015b, Friedrich, 2016) and single-establishment firms (see Table B.18).
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Table 6: Transition dynamics of the managerial organization, 2000–2010 panel
(a) # managerial layers of firm
# layers in t/t+ 1 0 1 2 3 SE # firms
0 85 8 1 6 10,778
1 5 81 8 1 6 18,274
2 7 79 8 5 18,754
3 6 90 4 22,391
(b) # managerial layers at headquarters/establishment(s)
# layers in t/t+ 1 0/0 1/0 1/1 2/<2 2/2 3/<3 3/3 SE # firms
HQ 0/ est. 0 85 5 6 10,778
HQ 1/ est. 0 6 75 4 6 8 8,340
HQ 1/ est. 1 1 5 76 7 1 4 8,052
HQ 2/ est. 0,1 4 4 76 2 6 7 12,046
HQ 2/ est. 2 1 10 69 9 1 2 3,410
HQ 3/ est. 0,1,2 5 2 84 3 5 13,365
HQ 3/ est. 3 9 86 1 4,625
Panel (a) displays the percentage share of firms that transition from a number of managerial layers
in year t (given in the rows) to a potentially different number of layers in year t + 1 (given in
the columns). Panel (b) displays the percentage share of firms that transition from a managerial
organization in year t (given in the rows) to a potentially different managerial organization in
year t+ 1 (given in the columns). The figure in front of the slash denotes the number of layers of
the HQ. The figure behind the slash denotes the maximum number of layers of the establishments.
Firms with a higher number of layers at the establishments than at the HQ are dropped for
readability. Empty cells contain fewer than .5% of firms. Fewer than .5% of firms exit. Diagonal
in bold.
The lower panel displays the organizational dynamics at the level of the head-
quarters and establishments. We count the maximum number of managerial lay-
ers at the establishments to account for the potentially different number of estab-
lishments across firms. Over time, the managerial organization at the headquar-
ter/establishment level is less stable than the managerial organization at the firm
level: there is less mass on the diagonal of the lower panel than on the diagonal of
the upper panel. Notably, if multi-establishment firms change their organization,
they typically add or drop layers at either the headquarters or the establishment(s),
but not both. For example, among multi-establishment firms with two layers both at
the headquarters and the establishments, nine percent add a layer at the headquar-
ters and 10 percent drop a layer at the establishments. The latter adjustment does
not show up as reorganization at the firm level. Only one percent of firms choose a
lower or higher number of layers at both. Overall, among the firms that reorganize,
49 percent change the number of layers only at the headquarters, 42 percent change
it only at the establishments, and just nine percent change it at both.9
Fact 3 summarizes our finding.
9These figures refer to all firms, i.e., they include firms that have a higher number of layers at
the establishment than at the headquarters and are not included in Table 6.
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Fact 3. Multi-establishment firms that reorganize typically add (or drop) layers ei-
ther at the headquarters or at the establishments. Firms thus alternately choose
organizational structures with a higher number of layers at the headquarters than
the establishments and structures with an equal number of layers.
Robustness. Appendix B.3 documents the robustness of the results. Table B.19
shows that changes in the number of layers are related to changes in firm size,
consistent with the literature (Caliendo et al., 2015b, Friedrich, 2016). Table B.20
documents that the organizational dynamics are similar if the lowest-level layer
in each establishment is treated as non-managerial. Table B.21 shows that the
transition dynamics are comparable for longer time lags. Firms also typically add
or drop layers either at the establishments or the headquarters when we consider
a five-year period. Table B.22 shows that the results are similar for firms with
headquarters and exactly one establishment, and for firms with headquarters and
at least two establishments, hence the aggregation of the establishments in Table 6
does not drive the results. Table B.23 documents that the transition patterns are
similar for firms with only proximate and firms with distant establishments.
4 Model
We use Facts 1 to 3 to inform a model in which firms endogenously choose whether
to operate an establishment and the managerial organization.
4.1 Set-up
We consider an economy with two locations, j = {0, 1}. The economy consists of
agents and firms. The Nj agents per location each supply one unit of time to the
labor market. The agents are immobile, so wages wj may differ. Each firm i produces
one product. The agents consume the products supplied on the product market.
Production. Production is a problem-solving process based on labor and knowl-
edge (as in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012; Garicano, 2000). One unit of labor
employed in production generates a unit mass of problems. Problems are produc-
tion possibilities: the labor input turns into output if the problems are solved using
knowledge. Mathematically, knowledge is an interval ranging from zero to an upper
bound. We denote the length of a knowledge interval by z. A problem is solved
if it is realized within the knowledge interval. The problems follow a distribution
with the exponential density f(z) = λe−λz, where z ∈ [0,∞) refers to the domain
of possible problems and λ denotes the predictability of the production process. A
higher value of λ implies that problems in the tail of the distribution occur with
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lower probability, so more problems can be solved with a given amount of knowledge.
Combining n units of labor and knowledge z¯ yields
q = n
(
1− e−λz¯
)
units of output, where 1− e−λz¯ is the value of the cumulative distribution function.
A firm hires agents on the labor market to supply labor and knowledge for
production. The firm’s employees supply labor by spending their time generating
problems. To supply knowledge, employees must learn. They spend wjcz to learn a
knowledge interval of length z, where c denotes the learning cost that is equal across
locations. As is standard in the literature (e.g., Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012),
the firm remunerates the employees for their time and their learning expenses, so
employees receive remuneration wj(1 + cz).
The employees of the firm can communicate problems among themselves, and
hence can leverage differences in knowledge. Communication is costly: an employee
in location j spends θkj units of time helping an employee in location k. Helping is
more costly across locations than within a location: 1 > θ10 ≥ θ00 > 0. The helping
costs are symmetric: θ10 = θ01, θ11 = θ00. If an employee does not know how to solve
a problem, he cannot tell who knows, but must find a competent fellow employee.
Organization. Firms organize their employees in hierarchical layers (as in Caliendo
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012; Garicano, 2000). We call the employees at the lowest
layer ℓ = 0 production workers. They supply labor to generate problems and solve
those that are realized in their knowledge interval. We call the employees at the
higher layers ℓ ≥ 1 managers. They supply only knowledge for production and spend
their time helping the employees at the next lowest layer. The CEO constitutes the
highest managerial layer. All firms consist at least of production workers and a
CEO; they may also have one or more below-CEO layers of middle managers. The
knowledge levels of the employees are overlapping, so employees at layer ℓ know the
knowledge of employees at layer ℓ− 1 and more.10 Consequently, CEO knowledge z¯
delimits the maximum possible output per unit of labor input, because the CEO
is the most knowledgeable employee of the firm. An important assumption is that
each firm has exactly one CEO, who is thus a resource in limited supply for a firm.
The helping costs θjk, learning costs c, and the predictability of the production
process λ are exogenous parameters. Assumption 1 in the Appendix restricts the
possible parameter values. The model is partial equilibrium, so the wages wj are
also given. To simplify the exposition, sections 4.2 and 4.3 examine the organization
of a firm in location 0 taking output as given. Section 4.4 endogenizes output.
10Overlapping knowledge levels simplify the analysis, as overlaps and gaps between CEO and
establishment knowledge may occur with non-overlapping knowledge in multi-establishment firms.
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4.2 Single-establishment firm organization
We first determine the optimal organization of a firm in location 0 that only pro-
duces in its headquarters as a benchmark for the analysis of multi-establishment
firm organization.11 The organization consists of the number of below-CEO layers
of middle managers L ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the number nℓ0,L and knowledge level z
ℓ
0,L of em-
ployees per layer ℓ = 0, ..., L, and the knowledge of the CEO z¯0,L.
12 The indexes 0, L
refer to the location of the firm and the number of below-CEO layers, reflecting that
these variables affect the other choices.
The optimal number of below-CEO layers yields minimal production costs:
C (q˜) = min
L∈{0,1,2}
C˜0,L (q˜) (1)
Output q˜ comprises local output q˜0 and possibly the output for the other location q˜1.
The optimal number and knowledge levels of employees minimize costs for a given
number of layers:
C˜0,L (q˜) = min
{nℓ0,L,z
ℓ
0,L}
L
ℓ=0,z¯0,L≥0
L∑
ℓ=0
nℓ0,Lw0
(
1 + czℓ0,L
)
+ w0 (1 + cz¯0,L) (2)
s.t. n00,L
(
1− e−λz¯0,L
)
≥ q˜ (3)
1 ≥ n00,Lθ00e
−λzL0,L (4)
nℓ0,L ≥ n
0
0,Lθ00e
−λzℓ−10,L ∀ℓ = 1, ..., L (5)
z¯0,L ≥ z
L
0,L, z
ℓ
0,L ≥ z
ℓ−1
0,L ∀ℓ = 1, ..., L (6)
The production costs consist of the personnel costs for the employees and the CEO.
Constraint (3) specifies that the number of production workers and CEO knowledge
must suffice to produce output q˜. Constraints (4) and (5) reflect that the amount of
time of the CEO and the middle managers limit the number of problems that can be
communicated to them. This number is computed as the number of problems, n00,L,
multiplied by the helping costs, θ00, and the probability that the problem is not yet
solved, e−λz
ℓ−1
0,L . Knowledge levels are overlapping and positive (constraint 6).
Appendix C.2.1 contains the Lagrangian equation and the first order conditions.
Two multipliers from the Lagrangian equation help characterize the organization.
The multiplier for constraint (3), ξ0,L, denotes the marginal production costs. The
multiplier for constraint (4), ϕ0,L, denotes the marginal benefit of CEO time. As
the shadow price, ϕ0,L reflects how costly the CEO time constraint is for the firm.
The firm optimally chooses CEO knowledge such that its marginal cost and its
11Our results are consistent with Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012)’s for non-overlapping
knowledge.
12We restrict our attention to L+ 1 ≤ 3 managerial layers in line with sections 2 and 3.
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marginal benefit are equal:
w0c = λe
−λz¯0,Lξ0,Ln
0
0,L (7)
The marginal cost consists of the increase of CEO remuneration w0c. The marginal
benefit is the lower production costs, because every unit of labor yields more output.
Given CEO knowledge, constraint (3) determines the number of production
workers n00,L. Constraint (4) determines the knowledge level of the highest below-
CEO layer in the firm. The employees at the highest below-CEO layer have to
solve a sufficient fraction of problems so only the unit of CEO time is used. The
knowledge levels of the production workers and middle managers at lower layers are
a recursive function of the knowledge level at the highest below-CEO layer:
eλ(z
ℓ−1
0,L −z
ℓ−2
0,L ) =
(
1 + czℓ0,L
) λ
c
∀ℓ = 2, ..., L, (8)
eλz
0
0,L =
(
1 + cz10,L
) λθ00
c
. (9)
At each layer, the firm trades off the costs of higher knowledge in terms of higher
remuneration and the benefit of a lower number of employees at the next highest
layer. Constraint (5) determines the number of middle managers. Finally, the
marginal production costs ξ0,L and the marginal benefit of CEO time ϕ0,L are:
ξ0,L =
w0
(
1 + cz00,L +
c
λ
+ ✶(L ≥ 1)θ00
c
λ
∑L
ℓ=1 e
−λzℓ−10,L
)
1− e−λz¯0,L
,
ϕ0,L =
w0c
λ
eλ(z
L
0,L−z
L−1
0,L ) for L ≥ 1, ϕ0,0 =
w0c
λθ00
eλz
0
0,0 for L = 0.
Understanding how output q˜ affects firm choices is useful for the subsequent
analysis of multi-establishment firms.
Proposition 1. Given the number of below-CEO managerial layers L of the firm,
a) the knowledge of the CEO z¯0,L, the number n
ℓ
0,L and the knowledge z
ℓ
0,L of the
employees at all below-CEO layers ℓ ≤ L, and the marginal benefit of CEO
time ϕ0,L increase with output q˜.
b) The cost function C0,L(q˜) strictly increases with output q˜. The average cost
function AC0,L(q˜) is U-shaped. It reaches a minimum at q˜
∗
L where it intersects
with the marginal cost function, and converges to infinity for q˜ → 0 and q˜ →
∞.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.2.
CEO knowledge z¯0,L and the number of production workers n
0
0,L increase be-
cause labor and knowledge are complementary inputs in production. The larger the
19
output, the more problems the production workers generate and, if unsolved, com-
municate to higher layers. Higher output therefore increases the number of employ-
ees nℓ0,L at all below-CEO layers. However, the amount of CEO time is fixed. The
knowledge of the employees at the highest below-CEO layer zL−10,L increases because
the CEO cannot otherwise deal with all of the problems that are communicated to
him. The knowledge levels at lower layers zℓ0,L, ℓ = 0, ..., L− 1 also increase, though
to a lesser extent, thereby mitigating the increase in the number of employees at the
below-CEO layers. The larger the firm, the more beneficial it would be to increase
CEO time and avoid the increase in knowledge. Thus, the shadow price of the CEO
time constraint—the marginal benefit of CEO time—increases with output.
The resulting cost function is strictly increasing, as the marginal costs are posi-
tive. The average cost function is U-shaped. The U-shape reflects two counteracting
forces. On the one hand, the marginal costs of production increase with output.13
On the other hand, the quasi-fixed costs of the CEO and the middle managers are
spread over a larger output. For output levels below the minimum efficient scale,
q˜ < q˜∗L, the latter effect dominates; for those above, q˜ > q˜
∗
L, the former effect
dominates.
The optimal number of managerial layers minimizes the production costs. The
firm faces a trade-off. On the one hand, middle managers entail a quasi-fixed cost,
because they are remunerated but do not generate problems, i.e., production possi-
bilities. On the other hand, middle managers reduce the number of problems sent to
the CEO. They thus allow decreasing the knowledge of the production workers and
the marginal production costs. Consequently, adding a layer is only worthwhile if
the firm is sufficiently large. The optimal number of layers increases with output q˜.
Figure 1a illustrates the choice of adding a layer of middle managers using the
average cost function of a firm with only a CEO (L = 0) or a CEO and middle
managers (L = 1). The minimum efficient scale q˜∗L of an organization increases with
the number of below-CEO layers, reflecting the higher quasi-fixed costs of more
managers. The cost function becomes flatter with the number of layers, because the
marginal production costs increase less strongly with output. The firm adds a layer
at the crossing q˜10 (see also Appendix C.2.3).
4.3 Multi-establishment firm organization
The firm may maintain an establishment at location 1 to exploit wage differences or
to access the local product market. The possibility that w0 ≥ w1 reflects cost-cutting
motives. To capture market access motives, we assume that the firm incurs transport
costs if it sells output produced in one location at the other location. We assume
13The marginal costs globally increase with output for L = 0. For L > 0, they increase for
sufficiently high output; in particular, they increase at the minimum efficient scale.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the average cost function, no transport frictions
(a) Single-establishment firm (b) Multi-establishment firm
The figure plots the average cost functions of a SE and a ME firm for τ = 1, w0 = w1, θ00 = θ10.
Parameter values: cλ = .225, θ00 = .26 (from Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012), w0 = 1.
(a): The average cost function of a SE firm is U-shaped for a given number of below-CEO layers.
The firm adds a layer at q˜10 .
(b): The average cost function of a ME firm with a symmetric number of below-CEO layers 0/0 or
1/1 is U-shaped. The firm adds a layer at the establishment at q˜∗
0/0 = q˜
∗
0 and at the headquarters
at q˜
1/1
0/1 > q˜
1/1
0/0 = q˜
1
0 (or vice versa, as the 0/1 and the 1/0 organization have the same costs).
that transport costs τ ≥ 1 are iceberg-type.14 We take as given the potentially
different amounts of output {q˜j}
1
j=0 that the firm supplies at each location.
The CEO is located in the headquarters in location 0. The firm chooses whether
to produce only in the headquarters, the establishment or both, as well as the
number of below-CEO layers of middle managers Lj per location. We use the term
“organizational structure” and the variable ω to denote the combination of the
number of below-CEO layers L0/L1. All other endogenous variables depend on the
location and the organizational structure, so we index them by j, ω. If the firm
maintains an establishment, it chooses how much output qj,ω and which share sj,ω
of CEO time to allocate to the headquarters and the establishment. The firm also
determines the level of CEO knowledge z¯0,ω as well as the number n
ℓ
j,ω and knowledge
level zℓj,ω of the employees in each layer ℓ.
We split the optimization problem into three steps. First, the firm chooses the
optimal organizational structure ω from the set of possible structures Ω to minimize
its production costs, similarly to choosing the number of layers in section 4.2:
C
(
{q˜j}
1
j=0
)
= min
ω∈Ω
C˜0,ω
(
{q˜j}
1
j=0
)
(10)
Second, the firm determines the production quantities qj,ω and the allocation of
CEO time sj,ω and chooses CEO knowledge z¯0,ω to minimize the costs of the chosen
14I.e., τ ≥ 1 units of a good need to be shipped for one unit to arrive at destination.
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organizational structure. The costs consist of the costs per establishment and the
remuneration of the CEO time that is not used in production.
C˜0,ω
(
{q˜j}
1
j=0
)
= min
{qj,ω ,sj,ω}1j=0,z¯0,ω≥0
1∑
j=0
Cj,ω (qj,ω, sj,ω, z¯0,ω) +
[
1−
1∑
j=0
sj,ω
]
w0 (1 + cz¯0,ω) (11)
s.t. s0,ω + s1,ω ≤ 1 (12)
✶(qj,ω ≥ q˜j ∧ qk,ω ≤ q˜k)(qj,ω − q˜j − τ(q˜k − qk,ω)) ≥ 0, k 6= j (13)
Equation (12) reflects the CEO’s time constraint. Equation (13) states that the
production quantity at location j, qj,ω, has to cover local output q˜j and a potential
difference between local production and local output at location k including trans-
port costs: qj,ω ≥ q˜j + τ(q˜k − qk,ω) for qk,ω ≤ q˜k. In the special case that there are
no transport costs, τ = 1, the constraint boils down to qj,ω + qk,ω ≥ q˜j + q˜k ≡ q˜, i.e.,
the production quantities have to sum up at least to the total output q˜.
Third, the firm determines the number of employees and their knowledge for
each below-CEO layer. If the firm decides to produce at a location, the production
costs consist of the below-CEO personnel costs as well as the remuneration for the
CEO time allocated to it. Otherwise, the production costs are zero.
Cj,ω (qj,ω, sj,ω, z¯0,ω)


qj,ω>0
= min
{nℓj,ω ,z
ℓ
j,ω}
Lj
ℓ=0≥0
Lj∑
ℓ=0
nℓj,ωwj
(
1 + czℓj,ω
)
+ sj,ωw0 (1 + cz¯0,ω)
qj,ω=0
= 0
(14)
s.t. n0j,ω
(
1− e−λz¯0,ω
)
≥ qj,ω (15)
sj,ω ≥ n
0
j,ωθj0e
−λz
Lj
j,ω (16)
nℓj,ω ≥ n
0
j,ωθjje
−λzℓ−1j,ω ∀ℓ = 1, ..., Lj (17)
z¯0,ω ≥ z
Lj
j,ω, z
ℓ
j,ω ≥ z
ℓ−1
j,ω ∀ℓ = 1, ..., Lj (18)
The constraints (15)-(18) are analogous to the constraints (3)-(6).
We solve the problem backwards. We determine the number and knowledge of
the employees per layer, taking as given the firm level choices and the organizational
structure. We then solve for CEO knowledge, the allocation of CEO time and the
production quantities given the organizational structure, which we determine last.
Appendix C.3.1 contains the Lagrangian equations and the first order conditions.
Establishment-level choices. The establishment outcomes depend on the choices
at the firm level (CEO knowledge, the production quantities and the allocation of
CEO time) through the binding constraints (15)-(17). The formal expressions are
variants of those in section 4.2, so we state them in Appendix C.3.1.
Constraint (15) determines the number of production workers. Constraint (16)
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fixes the knowledge level of the highest below-CEO layer at the headquarters or
establishment as a function of the allocated share of CEO time. The knowledge
levels at lower layers are recursive functions of the knowledge level at the highest
below-CEO layer. Constraint (17) determines the number of middle managers. The
Lagrangian multipliers ξj,ω denote the marginal production costs and the multipli-
ers ϕj,ω denote the marginal benefit of CEO time at location j.
Firm-level choices. The firm balances the marginal benefit and marginal cost of
CEO knowledge, analogously to section 4.2:
w0c = λe
−λz¯0,ω
1∑
j=0
ξj,ωn
0
j,ω. (19)
The firm optimally uses the full unit of CEO time and produces only the given out-
put, i.e., the constraints (12) and (13) are binding. The firm can reduce production
costs by reallocating CEO time as long as the marginal benefit of CEO time is not
equal at the headquarters and the establishment. To some extent, the firm may also
reallocate the production quantity to reduce the production costs.
Proposition 2. Suppose the firm produces in the headquarters and the establish-
ment. The firm allocates CEO time to equalize the marginal benefit of CEO time
across the headquarters and the establishment. Formally, in optimum:
ϕ0,ω = ϕ1,ω. (20)
The firm chooses the production quantities either exactly equal to local output or
to equalize the marginal production costs adjusted by the transport costs across the
headquarters and the establishment. Consequently, the marginal production costs at
the headquarters and the establishment generally differ. Formally, in optimum,
ξ0,ω < τξ1,ω ∧ ξ1,ω < τξ0,ω if q1,ω = q˜1 ∧ q0,ω = q˜0, (21)
τξ0,ω = ξ1,ω if q0,ω = q˜0 + τ(q˜1 − q1,ω), and (22)
ξ0,ω = τξ1,ω if q1,ω = q˜1 + τ(q˜0 − q0,ω), (23)
In the special case of no transport frictions, τ = 1, the firm chooses the production
quantities to equalize the marginal production costs across the headquarters and the
establishment:
ξ0,ω = ξ1,ω if τ = 1, i.e., q1,ω = q˜ − q0,ω. (24)
Proof. See Appendix C.3.2.
The firm can flexibly allocate CEO time, so it reallocates CEO time until its
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marginal benefit is equal at the headquarters and the establishment. The transport
costs limit the flexibility of the allocation of production. The firm chooses between
three options: it produces output locally, ships it from the other location, or does
both. If the marginal costs at the headquarters are lower than the marginal costs
including transport costs at the establishment and vice versa, the firm produces as
much output locally as it would like to supply (equation 21). If the marginal costs
at the establishment are equal to the marginal costs at the headquarters including
the transport costs, the firm produces part of the establishment output locally and
ships part of it from the headquarters (equation 22). The analogous result holds if
the marginal costs at the headquarters and the marginal costs at the establishment
including the transport costs are equal (equation 23). In the special case of no
transport frictions, the firm is free to allocate production, so it reallocates quantities
until the marginal costs at the headquarters and the establishment are equal. Finally,
if the marginal costs including transport costs at the headquarters are lower than the
marginal costs at the establishment (or vice versa), the firm produces total output
in the headquarters (establishment).
Comparative statics. To derive the optimal organizational structure ω, it is use-
ful to understand how firm choices depend on the output q˜j and the helping costs θ10.
The comparative statics depend on whether the marginal costs adjusted by the
transport costs are equal across the headquarters and the establishment. Parameter
changes easily lead to a violation of equations (22) and (23), so these cases are un-
stable. The main text therefore assumes that equation (21) holds. Appendix C.3.7
contains the comparative statics for the other cases (including equation 24).
The comparative statics with respect to local output q˜j are similar to those for
single-establishment firms in Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. Suppose the firm produces in the headquarters and the establish-
ment. Suppose that the firm incurs transport costs τ > 1 to ship output from one
location to the other, and that ξj,ω 6= τξk,ω, j 6= k. Given the organizational struc-
ture ω,
a) CEO knowledge z¯0,ω increases with local output q˜j. Higher local output q˜j
increases the number of production workers at the same location n0j,ω and de-
creases their number at the other location n0k,ω, k 6= j.
b) The knowledge of the employees at all below-CEO layers zℓk,ω, ℓ ≤ Lk, k = 0, 1
and the marginal benefit of CEO time ϕk,ω increase with local output q˜j if the
CEO spends a sufficient share of time on location j.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.3.
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As in Proposition 1, higher output q˜j leads to higher CEO knowledge and a
higher number of production workers at location j because labor and knowledge
are complementary inputs. The firm hires fewer production workers at the other
location, because the higher CEO knowledge allows producing the same output with
fewer workers. If the CEO spends a sufficiently high share of time on the location
with the higher output, the increase in the number of production workers there
outweighs the decrease at the other location. The number of problems generated and
communicated to the CEO increases. To satisfy the CEO time constraint, below-
CEO knowledge levels increase at both locations. Correspondingly, the marginal
benefit of CEO time rises.
Higher helping costs θ10 at the establishment also affect the choices at the estab-
lishment and the headquarters.
Proposition 4. Suppose the firm produces in the headquarters and the establish-
ment. Suppose that the firm incurs transport costs τ > 1 to ship output from one
location to the other, that ξj,ω 6= τξk,ω, j 6= k, and that the helping costs across space
exceed the those within a location, θ10 > θ00. Given the organizational structure ω,
a) CEO knowledge z¯0,ω, the knowledge of the employees at all below-CEO lay-
ers zℓ1,ω, ℓ ≤ L1, and the marginal production costs ξ1,ω at the establishment
increase with the helping costs θ10. The total number of production work-
ers
∑1
j=0 n
0
j,ω and the number of production workers at the establishment n
0
1,ω
decrease.
b) The knowledge of the employees at all below-CEO layers zℓ0,ω, ℓ ≤ L0, the
number of production workers n00,ω, and the marginal production costs ξ0,ω at
the headquarters as well as the marginal benefit of CEO time ϕ0,ω decrease
with the helping costs θ10.
These comparative statics results hold if L1 ≤ 1 or if L1 = 2 and the establishment’s
share of CEO time s1,ω is sufficiently high.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.4.
Higher helping costs θ10 make it more costly to use CEO knowledge because
the CEO spends more time per problem. The firm increases CEO knowledge to
compensate the higher costs with a higher benefit of using the CEO. Due to the
CEO time constraint, more problems must be solved at below-CEO layers, so the
knowledge of the employees in the establishment increases. Therefore, the marginal
production costs rise. As higher CEO knowledge yields more output per unit of
labor input, the firm reduces the total number of production workers. In particular,
it decreases the number of production workers at the establishment because the
higher helping costs θ10 increase the costs of generating problems there.
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The increase in helping costs for the establishment θ10 also affects the head-
quarters. The number of production workers at the headquarters decreases because
local output is constant, but CEO knowledge increases. Fewer problems are gen-
erated, so the knowledge of the employees at the below-CEO layers decreases, as
do the marginal production costs. The firm compensates the higher helping costs
through organizational adjustments at the establishment and thus creates slack at
the headquarters. Consequently, the marginal benefit of CEO time decreases.
The key implication of Propositions 3 and 4 is that the organization of the multi-
establishment firm is interdependent across the headquarters and the establishment.
Changes in output or helping costs at the establishment result in organizational
adjustments at the establishment and the headquarters owing to the shared CEO.
This interdependence is also reflected in the choice of organizational structure.
Organizational structure. The firm chooses the organizational structure with
the minimal production costs. To render transparent the distinct effects of multi-
establishment production and location characteristics on organizational structure,
we study the organizational structure in three steps. First, we consider the special
case of multi-establishment production in two locations with the same characteristics
and no transport frictions, i.e., θ10 = θ00, w1 = w0 and τ = 1. Second, we add
transport frictions and the possibility of geographic frictions to the helping costs,
i.e., θ10 ≥ θ00, w1 = w0, q˜1 = q˜0 and τ > 1. Finally, we study differences in wages
and local output levels.
Special case: no transport frictions and symmetric location charac-
teristics, τ = 1, θ10 = θ00, w1 = w0. Without transport frictions, only total
output q˜ matters for managerial organization. The multi-establishment firm orga-
nizes production in such a way that the marginal production costs are equal at the
headquarters and the establishment (Proposition 2). The marginal costs are me-
chanically equal if the number of below-CEO management layers is equal at the
headquarters and the establishment. In this case, multi-establishment production
is equivalent to single-establishment production. If the number of below-CEO man-
agement layers differ, the firm effectively produces with two distinct, albeit with the
same marginal costs, production technologies. Maintaining an establishment that is
different from the headquarters allows the firm to use labor and knowledge in dis-
tinct ways, and to increase output by recombining them. Section 4.2 shows that the
efficiency of a certain number of layers depends on output for a single-establishment
firm. The multi-establishment firm can choose the optimal combination of layers for
its output by allocating CEO time and production quantities to the headquarters
and the establishment. This affects the choice of optimal organizational structure.
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Proposition 5. Suppose that wages and helping costs are equal, w0 = w1, θ00 = θ10,
and that there are no transport frictions, τ = 1. Let “L0/L0-organization” denote
the organizational structure of a multi-establishment firm with L0 below-CEO layers
at the headquarters and the establishment. Let “L0/L0+1-organization” denote the
organizational structure of a multi-establishment firm with L0 below-CEO layers at
the headquarters and L0 + 1 below-CEO layers at the establishment.
a) The average cost function of the L0/L0-organization is U-shaped in output and
reaches a minimum at q˜∗L0/L0.
b) The average cost of the L0/L0+1-organization and the L0+1/L0-organization
conincide. The average cost of the L0/L0 + 1-organization and the L0/L0-
organization are equal at q˜∗L0/L0. The average cost function of the L0/L0 + 1-
organization decreases with output q˜ for q˜∗L0+1/L0+1 > q˜ > q˜
∗
L0/L0
.
c) The average cost function of the L0 + 1/L0 + 1-organization intersects with
the average cost function of the L0/L0-organization at the output q˜
L0+1/L0+1
L0/L0
between the minimum efficient scales, i.e., q˜∗L0+1/L0+1 > q˜
L0+1/L0+1
L0/L0
> q˜∗L0/L0.
The average cost function of the L0/L0 + 1-organization intersects with the
average cost function of the L0 + 1/L0 + 1-organization at a higher level of
output q˜
L0+1/L0+1
L0/L0+1
> q˜
L0+1/L0+1
L0/L0
.
As a result, the multi-establishment firm with L0 below-CEO layers at the head-
quarters and the establishment adds a layer of middle managers at either the head-
quarters or the establishment at the output q˜∗L0/L0 and at the other unit at out-
put q˜
L0+1/L0+1
L0/L0+1
∈ (q˜
L0+1/L0+1
L0/L0
, q˜∗L0+1/L0+1).
Proof. See Appendix C.3.5.
Figure 1b illustrates the average costs of the multi-establishment firm, taking an
organization with 0 or 1 below-CEO layers as example. The figure shows that the
average cost functions of an organization with the same number of below-CEO layers
at the headquarters and the establishment are U-shaped (Proposition 5a). They
coincide with the average cost functions of a single-establishment firm. The average
cost function of the 0/0-organization increases for quantities above the minimum
efficient scale q∗0/0. In contrast, the average cost function of the 0/1-organization
(or 1/0-organization) decreases (part b). Consequently, the former intersects the
average cost function of the 1/1-organization at a lower quantity than the latter
(part c).15
15The average cost function of the 0/1-organization coincides with the average cost functions of
the the 0/0-organization and the 1/1-organization for quantities below and above the minimum
efficient scales respectively, because for those levels of output, single establishment production
with 0 and 1 below-CEO layers is more efficient than production with the 0/1-organization.
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Proposition 5 is a key result of the model. It states that the multi-establishment
firm successively reorganizes the headquarters and the establishment as it grows.
The firm can optimally combine different numbers of below-CEO layers at the head-
quarters and the establishment by allocating CEO time and output and thus reduce
production costs. At the quantity q∗L0/L0 , the L0/L0-organization has the minimum
average costs. A multi-establishment firm with a L0/L0 + 1-organization would al-
locate total output and CEO time to the headquarters with L0 below-CEO layers
at q∗L0/L0 . For higher output q˜ > q
∗
L0/L0
, the average costs of the L0/L0-organization
increase, because output exceeds the minimum efficient scale. The average costs
of the L0/L0 + 1-organization decrease up to the minimum efficient scale of the
L0 + 1/L0 + 1 organization, because the firm can allocate a share of output to the
establishment with L0 + 1 below-CEO layers. For output close to the minimum
efficient scale, only a small share is allocated to the establishment, but the larger
the output q˜, the larger becomes its share of production.
The layer of middle managers at the establishment releases CEO time: relative to
output, the CEO spends a larger share of time at the headquarters with L0 than at
the establishment with L0+1 below-CEO layers. This keeps below-CEO knowledge
low. The additional layer thus increases efficiency both at the establishment and
the headquarters. It decreases the need to add a layer of middle managers at the
headquarters. As in Propositions 3 and 4, the organization of a multi-establishment
firm is interdependent: The optimal number of layers at the headquarters depends
on the number of layers at the establishment (and vice versa).
Transport and helping cost frictions, τ > 1, θ10 ≥ θ00, w1 = w0, q˜1 = q˜0.
Figure 2a illustrates the average production costs of different organizational struc-
tures if local output, wages and helping costs are equal at the headquarters and the
establishment, but there are transport frictions. The average production costs are
U-shaped, as those of a single-establishment firm. This reflects how reallocating out-
put is efficient only under certain conditions (Proposition 2), and that the impact of
higher output on firm organization is similar to its impact in a single-establishment
firm (Proposition 3). As in a single-establishment firm, the minimum efficient scales
increase with the number of below-CEO layers, reflecting the quasi-fixed costs of
middle managers. The cost functions become flatter, because the marginal produc-
tion costs increase less steeply with output due to the middle managers.
Although the transport frictions affect the shape of the average cost function of
an organization with a different number of below-CEO layers at the establishment
and the headquarters, they do not affect the pattern of reorganization. The multi-
establishment firm does not add a layer at the headquarters and the establishment
at the same size, but successively at one and the other. The additional layer of
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Figure 2: Illustration of the average cost functions, transport frictions
(a) Symmetric locations (θ10 = θ00) (b) Helping costs θ10
The figure plots the average cost functions of a ME firm. Parameter values: cλ = .225, θ00 = .26
(from Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012), w0 = 1, w1 = w0, τ = 1.1, q˜0 = q˜1.
(a): At each kink, the ME firm adds a layer at one unit. The 0/1 and 1/0 organization have the
same costs. (b): Higher helping costs θ10 decrease the output at which the firm reorganizes.
middle managers at either the headquarters or the establishment releases CEO time
that can be reallocated to the establishment or the headquarters, respectively, and
thus decreases the need for middle managers therein.
Figure 2b illustrates how the helping costs across space θ10 affect the number of
managerial layers of the firm. Higher helping costs increase the knowledge levels of
employees and thus the marginal production costs at the establishment (Proposi-
tion 4). Adding a layer helps the firm to mitigate the cost increase, because it allows
decreasing production worker knowledge and thus marginal costs. The higher the
helping costs, the smaller is the level of output at which the firm adds a layer at the
establishment, as a comparison of the solid and dashed lines demonstrates.
In addition to their effect on multi-establishment firm organization, higher help-
ing costs affect multi-establishment production per se. Indeed, as higher helping
costs increase the marginal production costs at the establishment, production there
becomes less efficient relative to shipping output from the headquarters. Higher
helping costs thus reduce the desirability of maintaining an establishment.
Wage differences, w1 6= w0, τ > 1, θ10 ≥ θ00 and q˜1 = q˜0. Lower wages at
the establishment than the headquarters have the same effect as higher helping cost
across space on the managerial organization. The firm first hires middle managers
at the establishment, and then additionally at the headquarters as it grows, because
it is cheaper to hire middle managers at the establishment. Higher helping costs
reinforce the reorganization pattern (see Appendix Figure C.2).
Higher wages at the establishment than the headquarters render middle man-
agers at the establishment relatively more costly. Appendix Figure C.3 illustrates
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the choice of organizational structure under these conditions. If only wages differ
between the headquarters and the establishment, the firm adds a layer of middle
managers first at the headquarters and then also at the establishment as it grows
(Figure C.3a). Higher helping costs across space may outweigh the effect of higher
wages at the establishment, so the firm adds a layer of middle managers only at the
establishment for a range of output levels (Figure C.3b). Still, the wage difference
decreases the level of output at which middle managers at both the establishment
and the headquarters are optimal (Figure C.3c). Higher helping costs thus increase
the number of layers of middle managers at the establishment and the headquarters.
Output differences, q˜1 6= q˜0, τ > 1, θ10 = θ00 and w1 = w0. Appendix Fig-
ure C.4 studies output differences between the headquarters and the establishment
assuming that the location characteristics are equal. We assume that headquarter
output exceeds establishment output. Given that the location characteristics are
the same, the analogous results hold if establishment output exceeds headquarter
output. As the figure shows, hiring middle managers only at the establishment and
only at the headquarters is optimal for certain output levels. As explained after
Proposition 5, a multi-establishment firm with an unequal number of below-CEO
layers effectively combines two different production technologies. If total output is
close to the minimum efficient scale of the organization without middle managers,
hiring middle managers only at the establishment—the smaller unit—is optimal,
because the quasi-fixed costs of the middle managers are low, but they release CEO
time and thus decrease costs at the larger unit. For higher output levels, hiring
middle managers only at the headquarters—the larger unit—is optimal because the
firm saves the quasi-fixed costs of middle managers at the establishment. As local
output is endogenous and thus possibly depends on the helping costs, we study the
interplay of higher helping costs and output in the next section.
4.4 The optimal output
We return to the setting with many firms i that each produce a differentiated product
outlined at the beginning of section 4.1. We assume that each firm faces a downward
sloping demand curve for its product. Firms compete monopolistically, so there is
no strategic interaction between firms in their output choices.
Each firm chooses output levels q˜j to maximize profits:
max
q˜0,q˜1≥0
πi =
1∑
j=0
pj(q˜j)q˜j − C(q˜0, q˜1) (25)
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Proposition 6. Suppose that the firm produces at the headquarters and the estab-
lishment. Suppose that the local production quantities are equal to local output (i.e.,
ξj,ω 6= τξk,ω) and that they are sufficiently large. Higher helping costs across space θ10
decrease the optimal output at the establishment q˜1 and increases the optimal output
at the headquarters q˜0.
Proof. See Appendix C.4.16
Higher helping costs across space increase the marginal production costs at
the establishment and decrease the marginal production costs at the headquarters
(Proposition 4). Correspondingly, higher helping costs decrease the output at the es-
tablishment and increase the output at the headquarters. Consequently, the helping
costs have both a direct effect on the managerial organization and an indirect effect
through endogenous output. Thus, higher helping costs can increase the number of
layers of middle managers both at the establishment and at the headquarters due
to the change in the relative level of output, as Appendix Figure C.5 illustrates.
4.5 Comparison of facts and model
We summarize how the model relates to Facts 1 to 3. Fact 1 documents that distance
to headquarters reduces the investment probability at a location and correlates neg-
atively with establishment size. In the model, the helping costs θ10 reflect distance
and other geographic frictions. Higher helping costs increase the marginal produc-
tion costs of an establishment, and decrease its optimal output and the attractiveness
of a location for an establishment.
Fact 2 documents that the number of managerial layers of a firm increases with
the distance of its establishments, and that the organization of both the establish-
ment and the headquarters responds. In the model, the helping costs θ10 not only
affect the optimal choices at the establishment, but also at the headquarters due
to the common CEO. The higher marginal costs at the establishment increase the
use of middle managers there. Depending on local wages and local output, higher
helping costs also increase the use of middle managers at the headquarters.
Fact 3 documents that multi-establishment firms successively add middle man-
agers at the headquarters or the establishment as they grow. In the model, hiring
middle managers at the establishment (or the headquarters) releases CEO time that
is reallocated across locations. Efficiency increases throughout the firm, which re-
duces the need for middle managers at the headquarters (or establishment).
16The Appendix also includes the results for the case that ξj,ω = τξk,ω, j 6= k.
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Figure 3: Response of endogenous variables to change in the travel times
Travel times Helping costs ߠ௞଴,௞ஷ଴ Output ݍ௝෥
Organizational structure߱
CEO knowledge, allocation of CEO time/ outputݖ଴̅,ఠ, ሼݏ௝,ఠ, ݍ௝,ఠሽ∀௝
Number and knowledge of employeesሼ ௝݊,ఠℓ , ݖ௝,ఠℓ ሽ∀௝
The graph illustrates the response of the endogenous variables to a change in travel times according
to the model in Section 4. The arrows denote causal relationships between the variables at the
nodes. The node symbol • (◦) denotes that a variable is (un)observable. G# denotes that a group
of variables contains observable and unobservable variables.
5 Reorganization due to high-speed train routes
A key implication of the model is that geographic frictions between the establish-
ment and the headquarters affect the organization of both the establishment and
the headquarters due to the common CEO. We exploit the opening of high-speed
train routes in Germany to provide evidence on this prediction.17 The new routes
make it easier to travel between the headquarters and the establishments and thus
exogenously reduce the costs to manage the establishments from the headquarters.
In the terms of the model, they decrease the helping costs θ10.
5.1 Model predictions
We focus on the model prediction that the helping costs θ10 between an establish-
ment and the headquarters not only affect the size and organization of this estab-
lishment, but also the size and organization of the headquarters (and other possible
establishments). The model disentangles how changes in helping costs affect firm or-
ganization. Figure 3 illustrates the model predictions using a directed graph. Solid
circles denote variables that are observable, and hollow circles denote variables that
are unobservable in our data. The arrows denote causal links between variables. To
keep the graph simple, we group variables by the steps of firm optimization and use
semi-solid circles if only part of the group is observable.18
Lower travel times reduce the helping costs between an establishment k and the
headquarters θk0. Lower helping costs θk0 increase the optimal output q˜k at the
establishment and decrease the optimal output q˜0 at the headquarters. The helping
17Charnoz et al. (2018) and Bernard et al. (2017) also use high-speed trains for identification.
18To recap, optimal output is determined via profit maximization. The number and knowledge
of employees are determined at the establishment level, taking as given CEO knowledge, the
allocation of CEO time and production that are determined at the firm level, taking as given the
organizational structure, which is determined in the final step of cost minimization.
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Figure 4: The new high-speed train routes and the German long-distance network
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The map shows the German long-distance rail network (black) and the new high-speed train routes
(bold red). Trains run at up to 300 km/h on the new routes, around 100 km/h faster than on the
other routes. Data from Deutsche Bahn AG (http://data.deutschebahn.com/dataset/geo-strecke).
costs thus have direct and indirect effects on firm organization. Lower helping
costs directly affect the organizational structure ω, because they reduce the optimal
number of layers and affect the attractiveness of multi-establishment production.
They indirectly affect the organizational structure because higher output increases
the optimal number of layers. Similarly, CEO knowledge z¯0,ω, the allocation of
CEO time sj,ω and the allocation of production qj,ω depend directly on θk0, but also
indirectly through q˜j and ω. The choice of the number and knowledge of employees
per layer nℓj,ω, z
ℓ
j,ω depends directly on θk0 and indirectly through z¯0,ω, sj,ω, qj,ω and ω.
The complexity of the relationship between the helping costs θk0 and the orga-
nizational outcomes has some implications for the interpretation of the empirical
estimates. The model’s predictions regarding the impact of a reduction in helping
costs at the establishment and headquarter level in Proposition 4 hold conditional
on output and the organizational structure. These variables do not vary exoge-
nously, but depend on the helping costs, and we do not have instruments for them.
If we conditioned on output or organizational structure in an establishment-level
regression, the estimation would entail a “bad control” problem (Angrist and Pis-
chke, 2014, 214-7). Our empirical exercise therefore estimates the total—direct and
indirect—effect of changes in helping costs.
5.2 Travel time data
We use information on the travel times between German cities from Deutsche Bahn
AG, the state-owned German railway firm. We utilize that travel times changed
substantially due to the opening of three high-speed train routes during our sample
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period.19 Trains on these routes exclusively transport people. Figure 4 displays a
map of the new high-speed train routes and how they connect to the existing long-
distance network. Deutsche Bahn AG constructed new rails (routes 1, 3) or substan-
tially upgraded the existing railway network (route 2). Route 1 almost halved the
travel time between Frankfurt and Cologne from 135 to 76 minutes. Service started
in August 2002 (Eurailpress.de, 2002). Route 2 reduced the travel time between
Hamburg and Berlin from 135 to 90 minutes from December 2004 (Eurailpress.de,
2004). Route 3 opened in May 2006 and reduced the travel time between Ingolstadt
and Nuremberg from 66 to 30 minutes (Brux, 2006). Except for the Hamburg-Berlin
connection, the high-speed trains run at up to 300 km/h and thus around 100 km/h
faster than on the other routes of the German long-distance network.
As Figure 4 shows, the German long-distance railway network is highly intercon-
nected compared to other countries. For instance, Paris is the center of the French
railway network, which approximately has a “star” structure. In comparison, the
German network features several hubs. Reductions in travel time therefore affect
more cities than merely those at the immediate ends. For example, route 1 between
Cologne and Frankfurt has reduced travel times from cities in the Ruhr area to those
in East and South Germany, such as Leipzig, Stuttgart, and Wu¨rzburg.
We use information on the mean and minimum net travel times and the number
of changes between cities in the years 2000, 2004 and 2008. We follow Deutsche Bahn
AG and compute travel times as time on the train plus 30 minutes per change. Our
data comprise 115 train stations that are connected to the long-distance network
in at least one of the three years. To ensure that temporary construction works
do not affect travel times, Deutsche Bahn AG computed the travel times for three
different weekdays in March, June and November. Travel times may change for
several reasons, such as adjustments to time tables, construction works, or new
changeover connections. To allow us to disentangle lower travel times due to the
new routes and other reasons, the data contain an indicator for station pairs where
more than 50 percent of passengers used one of the new high-speed routes in 2008.
We merge the travel times and the data on multi-establishment firms using the
information on the county where the establishment and the station is located. We
restrict the sample to firms that have headquarters and at least one establishment
connected to the long-distance network to avoid unobservable differences between
firms connected and unconnected to the network driving the results.
A possible concern is that trains are not an attractive means of transportation for
business travelers. However, this is not true of the high-speed trains. According to
information from Deutsche Bahn AG for the year 2017, the share of business travelers
19A fourth route between Leipzig and Berlin opened in 2006. However, the travel time between
these cities decreased gradually according to the data, so we cannot use this route in the estimation.
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on the new routes was about double their average share.20 This is unsurprising given
that the high-speed routes render the train the fastest means of transportation
between the connected cities. It is faster to travel by train than by car—it takes
almost twice as long to drive from Frankfurt to Cologne than by train, for example—
or even plane.21 In addition, the high-speed trains are a flexible means of travel as
regular tickets are valid on all trains that service a connection.
5.3 Empirical specification
To understand the effect of lower travel times on directly affected establishments,
we estimate:22
yijt = β0 + β11{Lower travel times to HQ}ijt + αj + αct + ǫijt (26)
i refers to a multi-establishment firm, j to an establishment, h to the headquarters,
c to the county where an establishment is located and t indexes time. α denotes
fixed effects. The variable of interest is an indicator variable for at least 30 minutes
lower minimum travel times between the establishment and its headquarters.
To gauge the effect on the headquarters, we estimate:
yiht = β0 + β11{∃j with lower travel times to HQ}iht + αh + αdt + ǫiht (27)
where d denotes the headquarter county. The variable of interest is equal to one if
travel times to at least one establishment decrease by at least 30 minutes. To assess
the effects on non-directly affected establishments of affected firms, we estimate:
yikt = β0 + β11{No lower travel times to HQ (28)
∧∃j 6= k with lower travel times to HQ}ikt + αk + αct + αdt + ǫikt, k 6= j
k refers to a non-directly affected establishment. The indicator variable is equal to
one if the travel time between establishment k and the headquarters is constant,
but the travel time between one of the other establishments of the firm and the
headquarters decreases by at least 30 minutes. As outcome variables yi.t, we use
the number of non-managerial employees as the measure for size and the number of
managerial layers and the managerial shares for establishment organization.
The specifications mimic difference-in-differences estimation. The “treatment” is
20The statistics are computed based on the fraction of tickets sold with a corporate discount.
21In fact, a regular plane service between Cologne Bonn Airport and Frankfurt Airport was
discontinued in 2007. The carrier Lufthansa cited the new high-speed train route as the main
reason for lower demand (Eurailpress.de, 2007). The number of flights between Cologne Bonn
Airport and Nuremberg Airport has also dropped substantially (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007).
22This specification is similar to Charnoz et al. (2018).
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lower travel times between the directly affected establishment and the headquarters
and at least one establishment and the headquarters, respectively. Its baseline effect
is captured by the establishment or headquarters fixed effects. The (headquarter)
county × year fixed effects capture the “after” dummy. The indicator variables 1{·}
correspond to the interaction term of the “treatment” and “after” dummy variables.
We implement the estimation using the reghdfe command by Correia (2014).
Differences in travel times may also affect other model parameters, such as local
wages because employees commute longer distances (Heuermann and Schmieder,
2019). Firms may additionally benefit from better suppliers (Bernard et al., 2017).
The county-year and headquarter county-year fixed effects isolate the impact of lower
spatial frictions on firm organization from other forces. Specifically, the regressions
for directly affected establishments compare establishments with travel time reduc-
tions and establishments in the same county and year with constant travel times.
Lower local wages or better suppliers benefit all establishments, so our estimation
strategy accounts for their effect. Similarly, the regressions for the headquarters
compare headquarters with travel time reductions to at least one of their establish-
ments to headquarters in the same county and year without. The specification for
non-directly affected establishments compares establishments that belong to firms
with treated establishments to establishments in the same county and year that
belong to firms without treated establishments, additionally accounting for shocks
at the headquarters location.23 Given that being treated in this set-up presupposes
that firms have at least two establishments, we restrict the sample accordingly.
A possible concern with respect to our identification strategy is that firms are
aware of the construction of high-speed train routes prior to opening, so they may
strategically locate their establishments. Importantly though, while the location of
the routes is predictable, their opening is not. For example, route 3 between Ingol-
stadt and Nuremberg was initially scheduled to open in 2003, but this was delayed
to 2004 and eventually mid-2006. Changes to establishment organization should
only materialize after opening. We make sure that treated establishments exist at
least one year before the route is opened. A few establishments and headquarters
move from one county to another during the sample period. We use their original
location for the main analyses and drop them from the sample in robustness checks.
We set the indicators equal to one if the travel time between an establishment
and the headquarters decreases by at least 30 minutes because the high-speed train
routes decrease the travel times by at least 30 minutes.24 As Appendix Table D.1
23The strictest specification would condition on county × headquarter county × year fixed effects,
i.e., compare establishments of firms with travel time reductions for at least one establishment to
establishments of firms without reductions in the same county with headquarters in the same
headquarter county. However, there are too few pairs in the sample to run these regressions.
24One may worry that a possibly endogenous reduction in the number of changes triggers the
treatment dummy. In the data, the number of changes decreases either due to the new high-
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shows, virtually none of the non-high-speed-route connections exhibit lower travel
times of 30 minutes or more. The threshold thus helps us ensure that the reduction
is indeed driven by the exogenous new routes instead of potentially endogenous
demand-driven adjustments to the time-table.
Helping cost channel. Lower travel times make it easier for headquarter man-
agers to travel to the establishments. The model spells out a specific channel how
such a reduction of within-firm geographic frictions affects the organization of multi-
establishment firms: lower travel times reduce the helping costs between the head-
quarters and the establishment. At the same time, lower travel times may reduce
other managerial frictions, such as monitoring costs (see, e.g., Giroud, 2013).
To support the helping cost channel, we document that the estimated effects are
heterogeneous across sectors. We use a sector-level measure for λ, the predictability
of the production process. A higher value of λ means that problems in the tail of
the problem probability distribution occur with lower probability. The higher λ, the
higher is the reduction in the number of problems sent to the CEO that is caused
by an increase in local knowledge. Changes in helping costs should therefore have
more pronounced effects on the endogenous choices in sectors with a less predictable
production process, i.e., lower value of λ. Appendix D.2 contains the results of
simulations corroborating this heterogeneity.
We use the measure of the predictability of the production process from Gumpert
(2018). The measure is based on a survey question from the “BiBB/BAuA Employ-
ment Survey 2006” administered by the German Federal Institute for Vocational
Education and Training (Bundesinstitut fu¨r Berufsbildung, BiBB) and the Federal
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeitsschutz und
Arbeitsmedizin, BAuA) (see Hall and Tiemann, 2006). The survey provides data on
the employment conditions of a representative sample of 20,000 workers in Germany.
The measure exploits the question of how often respondents have “to react to and
solve unforeseeable problems” in their current job. It is constructed by restrict-
ing the sample to two-digit sectors with at least 25 respondents and regressing a
dummy that is equal to one if participants answer “frequently,” and zero if they an-
swer “sometimes” or “never,” on sector dummies. The estimated coefficients of the
sector dummies are inversely related to the predictability of the production process.
We merge the measure to our data using the headquarter sector of a firm. We
separately run the regressions for firms with above- and below-median predictability.
While this exercise does not refute the possibility that lower travel times reduce
monitoring costs within firms, it corroborates that the model mechanism of lower
helping costs is at play in driving the results.
speed routes, or if a station is connected to the long-distance network. Our results are robust to
restricting the sample to stations connected to the long-distance network in all years (see below).
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Table 7: Regression results, 2000–2010 panel
All firms Firms with ≥ 2 establishments
Dep. variable # em. # lay. Mg.sh. Mg.sh. # em. # lay. Mg.sh. Mg.sh.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Directly affected establishment
Est. treated 0.061∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.213 −0.145 0.074∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.033 −0.147
(0.018) (0.008) (0.226) (0.143) (0.019) (0.009) (0.241) (0.154)
# observations 94,354 94,354 94,354 94,354 83,894 83,894 83,894 83,894
# est. 13,544 13,544 13,544 13,544 12,244 12,244 12,244 12,244
R-squared 0.802 0.874 0.912 0.868 0.803 0.878 0.911 0.869
Est. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Headquarters
Firm treated −0.015 0.019 0.688∗∗ 0.063 −0.018 0.041∗ 1.054∗∗ 0.631∗
(0.018) (0.015) (0.252) (0.192) (0.021) (0.019) (0.323) (0.251)
# observations 22,884 22,884 22,884 22,884 12,264 12,264 12,264 12,264
# HQ 2,875 2,875 2,875 2,875 1,587 1,587 1,587 1,587
R-squared 0.909 0.883 0.935 0.892 0.932 0.890 0.935 0.897
HQ FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ c.-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Non-directly affected establishment
Firm treated −0.003 0.009 0.523∗ 0.412∗∗
(0.018) (0.008) (0.217) (0.140)
# observations 72,040 72,040 72,040 72,040
# est. 10,995 10,995 10,995 10,995
R-squared 0.807 0.883 0.912 0.873
Est. FE Y Y Y Y
County-year FE Y Y Y Y
HQ c.-year FE Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent
variables: # em.: log number of non-managerial employees; # lay.: number of managerial layers
of establishment/HQ; Mg.sh.: share of managerial occupations in wage sum in percent, where
managerial occupations are determined according to layers in columns 3 and 7 and according to
Blossfeld occupational categories in column 4 and 8. All variables are winsorized at the first and
99th percentiles.
5.4 Regression results
Table 7 presents the regression results. Columns 1 to 4 contain results for all firms.
Columns 5 to 8 restrict the sample to firms with at least two establishments in ad-
dition to their headquarters. The top panel contains the results for directly affected
establishments, the middle panel those for headquarters, and the bottom panel those
for non-directly affected establishments.
Lower travel times increase the size of the directly affected establishments. The
number of non-managerial employees increases by six to seven percent. Interestingly,
this increase is not accompanied by an increase in the number of layers. Instead,
the managerial shares tend to decrease, although not significantly. These results are
consistent with higher establishment growth due to faster travel times.
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Table 8: Regression results, sample split (median predictability), 2000–2010 panel
Below-median predictability Above-median predictability
Dep. variable # em. # lay. Mg.sh. Mg.sh. # em. # lay. Mg.sh. Mg.sh.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Directly affected establishment
Est. treated 0.122∗∗∗ 0.017 0.350 −0.234 0.029 −0.014 −0.587∗ −0.063
(0.033) (0.015) (0.386) (0.249) (0.023) (0.010) (0.291) (0.185)
# observations 44,995 44,995 44,995 44,995 45,651 45,651 45,651 45,651
# est. 7,002 7,002 7,002 7,002 6,048 6,048 6,048 6,048
R-squared 0.769 0.856 0.913 0.908 0.844 0.897 0.914 0.795
Est. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Headquarters
Firm treated −0.052+ 0.065∗∗ 1.021∗ 0.074 0.003 −0.017 0.039 −0.118
(0.031) (0.024) (0.449) (0.362) (0.023) (0.022) (0.325) (0.232)
# observations 9,914 9,914 9,914 9,914 11,556 11,556 11,556 11,556
# HQ 1,281 1,281 1,281 1,281 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428
R-squared 0.904 0.884 0.944 0.917 0.929 0.895 0.932 0.851
HQ FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ c.-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Dependent variables: see Table 7. All variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles.
Lower travel times lead to organizational adjustments at the headquarters. While
headquarter size stays constant, the number of managerial layers and the managerial
share in the wage sum increase significantly. This effect is particularly pronounced
for the headquarters of firms with at least two establishments. Quantitatively, the
coefficient estimates are equivalent to an increase of the managerial share by three
to four percent in the average firm (six percent if defined according to the Blossfeld
occupational categories). The findings are consistent with the notion that lower
travel times help firms manage their growing establishments from the headquarters.
The impact of lower travel times goes beyond the headquarters. Establishments
that do not themselves benefit from lower travel times, but belong to firms that do,
grow at the same rate as establishments that belong to firms that do not benefit
from lower travel times. However, their managerial share increases considerably,
consistent with more local managerial capacity. Overall, the results strongly support
the model’s implication that geographic frictions between the establishment and the
headquarters affect the organization of both the establishment and the headquarters
as well as possible other establishments of the firm.
Helping cost channel. Table 8 documents that firms in sectors with below-
median predictability of the production process drive the results in Table 7. We
split the sample at median predictability. We focus on the full sample of firms and,
correspondingly, on the results for establishments and headquarters. If we restrict
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the sample to firms with at least two establishments, the sample size decreases
excessively for meaningful headquarter regressions.
As a comparison of columns 1 to 4 and columns 5 to 8 of Table 8 clearly shows,
the firms in sectors with below-median predictability of the production process drive
the results in Table 7. The treated establishments in those sectors grow significantly
faster than untreated ones. The effect size is twice as high as in the full sample.
In contrast, the treated establishments in sectors with above-median predictability
grow at the same rate as untreated ones. We find organizational adjustments for
the headquarters only in the low-predictability sample. The effects are again more
pronounced than the corresponding effects in columns 1 to 4 of Table 7. Table 8 thus
supports the notion that lower travel times affect managerial organization through
the channel of lower helping costs across space.
Robustness. Appendix D documents the robustness of the results. The first set
of robustness checks varies the main variables in the baseline regressions. Table D.2
documents that the results are similar if we define the treatment dummies based on
the change in mean instead of minimum travel times between locations. Table D.3
shows that the results are robust if we count the managerial layers at the establish-
ment level. One may be concerned that the regressions “overfit” the data, because
they contain both establishment (or headquarter) and (headquarter) county-year
fixed effects. Table D.4 replaces the (headquarter) county-year fixed effects with
Bundesland-year fixed effects.25 The Bundesland-year fixed effects reduce the num-
ber of spatial fixed effects substantially from up to 1,500 to less than 180. The
estimated effects tend to be larger and slightly more significant. Table D.5 shows
that the effects are robust to clustering standard errors by establishment (or head-
quarters) and (headquarter) county. Only for the headquarters are the effects on
the managerial share now marginally significant (see also Table notes).
The second set of robustness checks alters the sample. Table D.6 replicates
the regressions after dropping establishments or headquarters that move between
counties. The results for the establishments are virtually unchanged; the results for
the headquarters even become a little stronger. Table D.7 shows that the results are
robust to restricting the sample to establishments or headquarters that are connected
to the long-distance network in all years. This ensures that the high-speed routes,
not (dis)connecting stations to the network, drive changes in travel time.
25We do not implement this check for the indirectly affected establishments, because headquar-
ters and establishments are often in the same Bundesland.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the relationship between geographic frictions within firms
and firm organization. We show that geographic space is an important determi-
nant of firm organization. Using detailed and comprehensive data on German firms,
we find that geographic frictions increase the use of middle managers in multi-
establishment firms. Our model of managerial organization explains this finding
based on the assumptions that the headquarters and establishments of a multi-
establishment firm share a common CEO with limited capacity, and that geographic
frictions increase the costs of accessing the CEO. The model implies that multi-
establishment organization is interdependent across headquarters and establishment.
We utilize the opening of new high-speed train routes as a natural experiment to
provide evidence for this prediction. Consistent with the model, we find that geo-
graphic frictions between the headquarters and a single establishment not only affect
the organization of that establishment, but also that of the headquarters and other
establishments of the firm.
The key implication of our study is that multi-establishment organization is in-
terdependent across establishments, hence local conditions propagate across space
through firm organization. Although prior literature has discussed managerial con-
straints as a propagation mechanism, most analyses have prioritized the role of
financial constraints. Our paper provides the first formal analysis of the role of
managerial constraints for multi-establishment firm organization. Our theoretical
and empirical results suggest that quantifying the relative importance of managerial
and financial constraints as propagation mechanisms for local shocks would consti-
tute a fruitful area for future research.
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Appendix
A Data
A.1 Data sources and record linkage procedure
A.1.1 Social security data
Employee history. The Integrated Employment Biographies (Integrierte Erwerbsbi-
ografien, IEB) are based on records from the German Social Security System. They
contain information on all employees subject to social insurance contributions since 1975
and are updated at least annually. The data cover nearly all private sector employees in
Germany, but do not include civil servants and the self-employed. The IEB contain in-
formation on birth year, gender, nationality, education, occupation, full time or part-time
status and daily earnings of each employee. Jacobebbinghaus and Seth (2007) and Antoni
et al. (2016) provide a detailed description of the structure of the data.26
Information on education is not reported in all periods for every individual, but can
be inferred from other observations on the same individual. We follow Fitzenberger et al.
(2005) and impute missing values of the education variable based on past and future
information.
Establishment History Panel. The Establishment History Panel (Betriebshistorik-
panel, BHP) is a panel data set that contains information on the number of employees,
sector and location of all establishments with at least one dependent employee on 30 June
of each year since 1975. Following the regulations of the German Federal Employment
Agency, an establishment is defined as the aggregation of all employees in a municipality
that are working for the same firm in the same sector.27 Sectors are defined based on
the Classification of Economic Activities of the German Statistical Office. The location
of establishments is provided at the county level. Germany is divided into 402 counties
with around 200,000 inhabitants on average. German counties are roughly comparable to
counties in the US. Schmucker et al. (2016) provide a detailed description of the data set.
Extension files on entries and exits of establishments. The extension files use
information on worker flows to identify establishment openings and closings. Establish-
ment identifiers may change when a firm restructures. The extension file helps mitigate
bias related to restructurings. Hethey and Schmieder (2010) provide details on the file.
A.1.2 Orbis
We use firm-level balance sheet information from the database Orbis of the commercial
data provider Bureau van Dijk (BvD). BvD compiles data from publicly available sources
as well as by acquiring data from other commercial data providers. For Germany, BvD’s
main data provider is Creditreform. BvD defines a firm as an independent unit that holds
a specific legal form and may incorporate one or more establishments.
It is important to note that BvDs financial information on firms in Germany is most
reliable since 2006, as there have been some changes in the financial reporting system in
Germany in that year. In earlier years, a higher share of financial information is missing.
26Antoni et al. (2016) focus on the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies (SIAB), a
2% random sample drawn from the IEB.
27That is, if a firm has several plants in a municipality, all plants in the same sector are assigned
the same establishment identifier. Plants in different sectors have distinct identifiers even within
the same municipality.
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A.1.3 Record linkage procedure
We use a linkage table between the social security records and the Orbis database. The
record linkage was performed independently of our project by the German Record Linkage
Center (GRLC, see Antoni and Schnell (2017) or www.record-linkage.de for more details).
The basis of the linkage was an extract of Orbis acquired by the Institute for Employment
Research (IAB). This extract contained data on all German firms at the reference date of
January 30, 2014. Of the 1,938,990 firms contained in the data, 1,627,668 were marked as
active in Germany.
Apart from a wide range of financial variables, the extract contained the name, legal
form and address of each firm. The GRLC used these identifiers to link the firm-level
data to the administrative establishment-level data of the IAB. This was made possible
by the fact that firms have to apply for an establishment number to be issued centrally
by the Federal Employment Agency (BA) for each establishment they set up. During this
process, firms are required by law to provide their name, legal form and address to be
recorded in the Data Warehouse (DWH) of the BA. At the time of the record linkage, the
DWH included names, the superordinate firm’s legal form and addresses of establishments
that had been active before or in 2013. To increase the linkage success while also limiting
the computational and memory requirements, the GRLC used linkage identifiers of all
establishments that had been recorded as active in Germany at least one day during the
years 2011 to 2013. Despite this restriction, names, legal forms and addresses of more
than 12 million different establishment numbers could be used for the record linkage.
The whole set of identifiers is used to identify the headquarters establishment of the
firm. Other establishments within the same firm do not have to be located in the same
municipality as the headquarters, which is why additional establishments were linked using
only the name and legal form of the firm. In some steps of the iterative linkage process,
the GRLC also used the main sector of activity, as this is also contained in both databases.
As these identifiers are non-unique and error-prone, the GRLC developed extensive
cleaning, standardization and parsing routines (usually referred to as pre-processing) to
achieve records that could successfully be compared between the two data sources. To deal
with remaining differences in, for instance, the spelling or abbreviations of the identifiers,
the GRLC applied error-tolerant methods of record linkage (see Christen, 2012). The
resulting linkage process consists of 17 consecutive steps, not counting the pre-processing,
that varied in terms of which identifiers were used and how strict the requirements on
agreement of the compared records were. Schild (2016) provides a more detailed descrip-
tion of the record linkage process. Antoni et al. (2018) report on the linkage success and
the representativeness of the resulting data set.
To rule out that we classify independent firms with similar names as multi-establishment
firms by accident, we only keep establishments that were matched based on the following
criteria: exact long name and legal form, exact short name and legal form, exact long name
(with or without activity component) and zip code, exact short name (with or without
activity component) and zip code.
A.1.4 Identification of headquarters
The record linkage procedure aimed at identifying as many establishments per firm as
possible without determining the headquarters of the firm. This information was added
by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) at the IAB afterwards. To do so, the FDZ performed
several iterative steps that mainly relied on the address of the firm according to Orbis
and of the establishments according to the administrative data. During later steps the
FDZ also used information on the share of administrative staff or the industry code of the
establishments. Antoni et al. (2018) provide details on the process.
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A.2 Sector and occupation classification
We use information on the establishment sector at the three digit level. The sector in-
formation is based on the respective latest sector classification of the German Statistical
Office that updated the classification in 1993, 2003 and 2008. We use the 2008 classification
for the 2012 cross-section. We follow Eberle et al. (2011) and transfer the sector classi-
fication after 2003 into the classification as of 1993 for the analyses using the 2000-2010
data. Results in the 2012 cross-section are similar if we use the 1993 classification.
The information on the occupation of employees follows the German classification of
occupations “Klassifikation der Berufe” (KldB). The years 2000-2010 contain the three
digit occupation according to the 1988 version of the KldB. The year 2012 contains the
five digit occupation according to the 2010 version of the KldB. In 2011, establishments
were free to report using either version of the KldB, so we exclude 2011 from our analysis.
A.3 Assignment of occupations to layers
Layers. To assign occupations to layers, we build on the classification of Caliendo et al.
(2015b) for the French PCS ESE occupation classification. We transfer the classification
to the international ISCO classification of occupations and from there to the German
occupation classification KldB. We use official correspondence tables from the German
Federal Employment Agency and the International Labor Organization (ILO). In some
cases, the translation assigns several layers to the same occupation. Following Friedrich
(2016), we generally assign the minimum level layer to these occupations. Table A.2
displays our assignment of occupations to layers.
In our data, we treat the lowest level layer in each firm as non-managerial. Firms
typically have consecutive layers, as the following table shows.
Table A.1: Share of firms with consecutive layers
# management layers 0 1 2 3
Consecutive organization Level 0 Level 0+1 Level 0+1+2 Level 0+1+2+3
SE firms 97% 69% 76% 100%
ME firms 96% 65% 79% 100%
Number of firms 22,068 32,573 34,130 20,586
The table displays the share of firms with consecutive layers in all firms with a given number of
management layers by firm type.
Blossfeld occupational categories. The assignment from Blossfeld (1983, 1987)
treats the following occupations as managerial: 751, 752, 753, 761, 762, 763.
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Table A.2: Assignment of occupations to layers
Level KldB 1988 KldB 2010 Examples
3 751 63124, 71104, 73294, 84394, 94494 Manager, executive,
director, board mem-
ber
2 721, 722,
724, 752,
753, 761,
763, 843
All sub-groups of type 2 in occupation groups:
434, 524, 815; of type 3 in occupation groups:
411, 431, 434, 524, 922; of type 4 in occupation
groups: 115, 411, 412, 431, 432, 433, 434, 511,
513, 516, 524, 532, 621, 625, 632, 633, 634, 712,
713, 715, 722, 723, 731, 732, 815, 824, 921, 922,
933;
Manager in business
organization and
strategy, finanical
analyst, software
developer, qualified
IT-specialist, lawyers
plus: 11494, 21194, 23294, 27194, 27294, 27394,
29194, 29294, 31174, 31194, 41203, 41303, 41383,
41304, 41384, 41394, 41403, 41404, 41484, 41494,
42124, 42144, 42314, 42324, 42394, 43152, 43323,
43343, 43353, 43383, 51133, 51233, 51533, 51543,
51594, 53184, 53394, 61194, 61294, 61394, 63114,
63194, 63313, 71224, 71333, 71433, 72144, 72194,
72243, 73394, 81214, 81234, 81404, 81414, 81424,
81434, 81444, 81454, 81464, 81474, 81484, 81804,
81814, 81884, 82594, 83193, 83194, 84194, 84294,
84304, 84494, 91344, 91354, 92113, 92304, 92394,
92424, 92434, 93303,
93313, 93323, 93343, 93383, 94214, 94493, 94404,
94414, 94484, 94534, 94794
Continued on next page
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Table A.2: Assignment of occupations to layers
Level KldB 1988 KldB 2010 Examples
1 31, 32, 601,
602, 603,
604, 605,
606, 607,
611, 612,
621, 622,
623, 624,
625, 626,
627, 628,
629, 633,
687, 762,
811, 812,
813, 822,
831, 841,
842, 844,
851, 852,
853, 855,
862, 863,
871, 872,
873, 874,
875, 881,
882, 883,
891, 892,
893, 922
All sub-groups of type 2 in occupation groups:
271, 273, 311, 312, 412, 414, 421, 613, 634, 811,
812, 817, 818, 821, 833, 844, 931, 932, 944, 946,
947; of type 3 in occupation groups: 233, 271,
312, 341, 421, 422, 423, 432, 523, 531, 532, 533,
541, 611, 612, 613, 625, 634, 721, 723, 733, 811,
812, 816, 817, 818, 821, 822, 833, 842, 845, 912,
913, 923, 924, 931, 941, 942, 945, 946, 947; of type
4 in occupation groups: 117, 221, 222, 223, 231,
233, 234, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 251, 252, 261,
262, 263, 312, 321, 322, 341, 342, 343, 422, 512,
523, 714, 813, 816, 817, 821, 822, 833, 845, 911,
912, 914, 931, 932, 935, 936, 941, 943, 946; plus:
1104, 11132, 11103, 11113, 11123, 11133, 11104,
11114, 11124, 11184, 11233, 11214, 11423, 11424,
11603, 11604, 11713, 11723, 12103, 12113, 12123,
12104,12144, 21113, 21114, 21124, 21213, 21223,
21233, 21313, 21323, 21363, 21413, 21423, 22103,
22183, 22222, 22203, 22303, 22333, 22343, 23113,
23123, 23222, 23223, 23224, 23322, 23413, 23423,
24133, 24203, 24233, 24303, 24413, 24423, 24513,
24523, 24533, 25103, 25133, 25183, 25213, 25223,
25233, 25243, 25253, 26113, 26123, 26223, 26243,
26253, 26263, 26303, 26313, 26323, 26333, 26383,
27104, 27184, 27212, 27223, 27283, 27224, 27284,
27313, 27304, 27314, 28103, 28113, 28123, 28133,
28143, 28104, 28114, 28213, 28223, 28214, 28224,
28313, 28343, 28314, 29103, 29113, 29123, 29133,
29143, 29104, 29114, 29134, 29203, 29213, 29223,
29233, 29243, 29253, 29263, 29273, 29283, 29204,
29284, 31103, 31133, 31143, 31153, 31163, 31173,
31104, 31114, 31124, 31134, 31144, 31154, 31164,
32103, 32113, 32123, 32203, 32223, 32233, 32243,
32253, 32263, 33133, 33213, 33223, 33233, 33243,
33303, 33323, 34203, 34213, 34233, 34303, 34323,
34343, 41213, 41283, 41293, 41322, 41313, 41323,
41314, 41324, 41413, 41423, 41433, 41483, 41414,
41424, 41434, 42114, 42134, 42202, 42334, 43102,
43112, 43122, 43313, 43333, 43363, 51182, 51113,
51123, 51183, 51223, 51243, 51503, 51513, 51523,
Quality manager,
training supervi-
sor, management
assistant, scientist,
engineer, interpreter
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Table A.2: Assignment of occupations to layers
Level KldB 1988 KldB 2010 Examples
0 Others Others Unskilled/semi-
skilled occupations
in metal-working,
printing, machine and
equipment assem-
blers, green keepers,
catering, office clerks
The KldB 1988 assigns a three digit code to each occupation. The KldB 2010 assigns a five digit code to each occupation. The first three digits denote the
occupation group. Digit 4 denotes the occupation sub-group. Digit 5 denotes the type of occupation (1 = unskilled/semi-skilled, 2 = skilled, 3 = complex, 4 =
highly complex).
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A.4 Descriptive evidence on occupations by layer
Evidence on wages and education by layer. Social security records.
Table A.3: Log wages and education by layer
Layer N Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Level based on occupation Log wages
0 4,271,175 4.439 3.921 4.179 4.451 4.712 4.975
1 1,378,410 4.761 4.266 4.527 4.811 5.097 5.173
2 629,518 4.954 4.542 4.820 5.070 5.173 5.173
3 76,969 4.980 4.503 4.908 5.173 5.173 5.173
Layer in firm Log wages
0 4,294,004 4.440 3.922 4.180 4.452 4.714 4.977
1 1,396,933 4.763 4.270 4.530 4.814 5.099 5.173
2 605,115 4.965 4.560 4.840 5.087 5.173 5.173
3 60,020 5.004 4.551 4.988 5.173 5.173 5.173
Level based on occupation Education
0 4,271,175 2.002 1 2 2 2 3
1 1,378,410 2.744 2 2 2 4 4
2 629,518 3.226 2 2 4 4 4
3 76,969 3.011 2 2 3 4 4
Layer in firm Education
0 4,294,004 2.007 1 2 2 2 3
1 1,396,933 2.744 2 2 2 4 4
2 605,115 3.238 2 2 4 4 4
3 60,020 3.092 2 2 4 4 4
2012 cross-section. Level based on occupation: level of layer, see Table A.2. Layer in firm: layer
treating the lowest level layer in each firm as non-managerial (layer 0) and assigning consecutive
numbers to higher level layers. Log wages: log daily wages. The top percentiles at layer 1-
3 are equal, because wages exceed the social security limit. Education: 1 - Primary school/
lower secondary school/ intermediate school leaving certificate, no vocational qualification; 2 -
Primary school/ lower secondary school/ intermediate school leaving certificate, with vocational
qualification; 3 - Upper secondary school leaving certificate (Abitur), with or without vocational
qualification; 4 - Degree from university/ university of applied sciences.
Evidence on the tasks of occupations by layer. The 2006 BiBB/BAuA Survey
of the Working Population administered by the German Federal Institute for Vocational
Education and Training (Bundesinistitut fu¨r Berufsbildung, BiBB) and the Federal Insti-
tute for Occupational Safety and Health (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedi-
zin, BAuA) collects data on the education, career and current employment conditions of a
representative sample of 20,000 working age individuals in Germany (Hall and Tiemann,
2006). The data contains information on the occupation of employees. We relate the tasks
of employees to the layer assigned their occupation by estimating, via OLS:
yi = βDlayer,i + γXi + δZi + ui (A.1)
where yi is individual i’s answer to a survey question about i’s tasks, Dlayer,i is a dummy
for the layer to which we assign individual i’s occupation, Xi is a vector of employee
characteristics and Zi are characteristics of i’s employer.
Figure A.1 plots the coefficients and confidence bands by layer. Table A.4 presents the
regression results.
53
Figure A.1: Evidence on tasks by layer, 2006 BiBB/BAuA survey
(a) Supervisor status (1=yes)
�
��
��
��
��
��
��
���
����
��
� � � �
�����
(b) Team size (ln # employees)
�
��
�
��
���
����
��
� � � �
�����
(c) Making tough choices
�
��
��
��
��
��
���
����
��
� � � �
�����
(d) Dealing with many duties
�
���
��
���
��
���
��
���
����
��
� � � �
�����
(e) Solving/ confronting problems
�
��
��
��
��
���
����
��
� � � �
�����
����������������������������� ������������������������
(f) Organizing others’ work
�
��
��
��
��
��
���
����
��
� � � �
�����
��������������� ����������� �����������������������
(g) Organizing own work
�
���
��
���
��
���
��
���
����
��
� � � �
�����
������������������������������ ��������������������������
(h) Skills (#)
�
��
�
���
�
��
���
����
��
� � � �
�����
The figure plots the estimated coefficients of the layer dummies in equation (A.1). In figures (c)-(g), 1=often. See notes of Table A.4 for the survey questions.
Summary. Employees at higher layers are significantly more likely to be supervisors. The median predicted probability that an employee at
layer 3 is a supervisor is 84%. Employees at higher layers also supervise larger teams. They are more likely to take decisions, have more duties and
responsibilities, solve unforeseeable and confront new problems, and organize work for others. They are more independent in organizing their own
work. The job of employees at higher layers also require more specific skills. Overall, this descriptive evidence corroborates the assumption that the
assignment of occupations to layers reflects differences between the managerial tasks and duties of employees in firms.
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Table A.4: Regression results: tasks by layer, 2006 BiBB/BAuA survey
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e1) (e2) (f1) (f2) (g1) (g2) (h)
Layer 1 0.065∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.050) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.055)
Layer 2 0.245∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.079) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.019) (0.025) (0.104)
Layer 3 0.463∗∗∗ 0.915∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 1.600∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.094) (0.027) (0.019) (0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.023) (0.016) (0.030) (0.129)
Age 0.002∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.001∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Tenure −0.000 −0.001∗∗ −0.000∗ −0.000 −0.000∗∗ 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender −0.122∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ 0.019 −0.084∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.021∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.454∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.041) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.041)
Constant 0.002 0.645∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 2.764∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.233) (0.046) (0.045) (0.048) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.048) (0.104) (0.179)
# observations 13,818 4,857 13,824 13,823 13,825 13,824 13,807 13,826 13,272 13,238 13,828
F (β1 = β2) 55.01
∗∗∗ 3.82+ 0.30 11.05∗∗∗ 1.78 2.35 1.98 6.79∗∗ 6.48∗ 2.01 0.74
F (β2 = β3) 55.32
∗∗∗ 21.37∗∗∗ 29.02∗∗∗ 4.41∗ 5.84∗ 1.30 26.00∗∗∗ 3.11+ 6.46∗ 7.05∗∗ 16.20∗∗∗
F (β1 = β3) 300.38
∗∗∗ 49.76∗∗∗ 49.30∗∗∗ 32.63∗∗∗ 3.07+ 0.01 56.41∗∗∗ 21.99∗∗∗ 40.18∗∗∗ 18.87∗∗∗ 16.91∗∗∗
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variables: (a) Supervisor status (1=yes); (b) How many
people do you supervise? (ln #) (c) How frequently do you make tough choices on your own responsibility? (d) How frequently do you deal with a range of duties
and responsibilities? (e1) How frequently do you have to react to and solve unforeseeable problems? (e2) How frequently are you confronted with new problems?
(f1) How frequently does the task of organizing and making plans appear in your job? (f2) How frequently does the task of consulting and advising appear in your
job? (g1) How frequently are you allowed to plan and schedule your work by yourself? (g2) How frequently are you able to influence the amount of work you have
to do? (h) Number of subject areas in which specialized skills are required. For questions (c)-(g), 1=often, 0=sometimes–never. Independent variables: Layer X:
indicator variable: occupation assigned to layer X; Age: age of respondent in years; Tenure: tenure of respondent in decades; Gender: gender of respondent,
1=female. Education, firm size and sector category fixed effects included. F (βj = βk): F-statistic, test for equality of coefficients of Layer j and Layer k.
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B Facts
B.1 Distance to headquarters decreases location probability
Table B.1: Location probability and establishment size, ME firms, 2000-2010 data
Dependent variable Location probability Log # est. employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log distance to HQ −0.315∗∗∗ −0.314∗∗∗ −0.379∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019)
Log market potential 0.744∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.029) (0.061) (0.052)
Relative wages −1.121∗∗∗ −0.859∗∗∗ −0.385∗ −0.363∗
(0.057) (0.059) (0.172) (0.159)
Relative land prices −0.016∗ 0.011
(0.006) (0.007)
# observations 24,393,507 11,832,114 24,393,507 171,146 86,084 171,146
# firms 10,323 8,478 10,323 8,547 6,982 8,547
HQ sector FE Y Y Y N N N
HQ county FE Y Y Y N N N
Legal form FE Y Y Y N N N
County FE N N Y N N Y
Year FE Y Y Y N N N
Firm-year FE N N N Y Y Y
Model Probit OLS
The table presents the coefficient estimates of a probit model (constant included; standard errors
clustered by HQ county in parentheses) in columns 1-3 and a linear model (standard errors clustered
by firm and county in parentheses) in columns 4-6. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Dependent and independent variables: see Table 3. Land prices are only available from 2005.
Columns 4-6 only includes firms establishments in at least two counties. FE = fixed effects.
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B.2 Distance to headquarters increases number of layers
Table B.2: Regression results, mg. organization of ME firms, establishment-level
layer definition, 2012 cross-section
Dependent variable # managerial. layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1]
Layers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Maximum log 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
distance to HQ (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Log area 0.025∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.010)
Log sales 0.127∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006)
Log # non-mg. 0.140∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
employees (0.004) (0.006)
# firms 5,111 1,661 9,275 2,768 9,275 2,768
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Legal form FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM
The table presents the coefficient estimates. Constant included. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Even columns include only ME firms with establishments in at least two
counties. Dependent variable: (1)-(4) number of managerial layers, (5),(6) managerial share in wage
sum, both defined treating the lowest-level layer in each establishment/the HQ as non-managerial.
Independent variables: see Table 4.
Table B.3: Regression results, mg. organization of establishments, establishment-
level layer definition, 2012 cross-section
Unit Establishment Headquarters
Dependent variable # layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1] # layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1]
Layers Layers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log distance 0.021∗∗ 0.026+
to HQ (0.007) (0.014)
Maximum log 0.044∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
distance to HQ (0.004) (0.009)
Log # non-mg. 0.309∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
employees (0.012) (0.004)
# est./HQ 35,079 35,079 9,812 9,812
Sector FE Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM Poisson GLM
The table presents the coefficient estimates. Constant included. Standard errors in parentheses
(clustered by firm in columns 1 and 2, robust in columns 3 and 4). + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p <
0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable: (1),(3) number of managerial layers, (2),(4) managerial
share in wage sum, both defined treating the lowest-level layer in each establishment/the HQ as
non-managerial. Independent variables: see Table 5.
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Table B.4: Regression results, mg. organization of ME firms, distance quartiles,
2012 cross-section
Dependent variable # managerial layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1]
Layers Blossfeld
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quartile 2 0.018 0.024 −0.012 −0.009
(0.018) (0.015) (0.035) (0.045)
Quartile 3 0.064∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗
(0.018) (0.015) (0.035) (0.045)
Quartile 4 0.082∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.015) (0.037) (0.047)
Log sales 0.117∗∗∗
(0.004)
Log # non-mg. 0.113∗∗∗
employees (0.004)
# firms 5,111 9,275 9,275 9,275
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y
Legal form FE Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM
The table presents the coefficient estimates. Constant included. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable: (1),(2) number of managerial layers, (3)
managerial share in wage sum, according to layers, (4) managerial share in wage sum, according to
Blossfeld occupational categories. Independent variables: Quartile 2-4 : dummies for quartiles of
the log of maximum distance between establishment and headquarters in km; others see Table 4.
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Table B.5: Regression results, mg. organization of establishments, distance quar-
tiles, 2012 cross-section
Unit Establishment Headquarters
Dependent variable # layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1] # layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1]
Layers Blossfeld Layers Blossfeld
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log distance 0.086∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.107
quartile 2 (0.020) (0.062) (0.091)
Log distance 0.126∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.310∗
quartile 3 (0.024) (0.079) (0.138)
Log distance 0.125∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗
quartile 4 (0.026) (0.074) (0.128)
Max. log distance 0.085∗∗∗ 0.086∗ 0.084
quartile 2 (0.018) (0.039) (0.058)
Max. log distance 0.132∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗
quartile 3 (0.018) (0.040) (0.057)
Max. log distance 0.185∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗
quartile 4 (0.018) (0.041) (0.056)
Log # non-mg. 0.258∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
employees (0.010) (0.004)
# est./HQ 29,416 35,079 35,079 9,536 9,812 9,812
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM Poisson GLM
The table presents the coefficient estimates. Constant included. Standard errors in parentheses
(clustered by firm in columns 1 to 3, robust in columns 4 to 6). ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001. Dependent variable: see Table 5. Independent variables: Log distance quartile 2-4 :
dummies for quartiles of log of distance between establishment and headquarters in km; Max. log
distance quartile 2-4 : dummies for quartiles of log of maximum distance between establishment
and headquarters in km; Log # of non-mg. employees: log number of employees at lowest layer.
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Table B.6: Regression results, mg. organization of ME firms, non-linear size, 2012
cross-section
Dependent variable # managerial layers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Maximum log 0.014∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
distance to HQ (0.004) (0.003)
Log area 0.019∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Log sales 0.465∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.041)
Log sales, squared −0.016∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
Log # non-mg. 0.091∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
employees (0.012) (0.017)
Log # non-mg. 0.003∗ −0.002
employees, squared (0.001) (0.002)
# firms 5,111 1,661 9,275 2,768
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y
Legal form FE Y Y Y Y
The table presents the estimated coefficients of Poisson regressions. Constant included. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Even columns include only
ME firms with establishments in at least two counties. Dependent variable: number of managerial
layers. Independent variables: see Table 4.
Table B.7: Regression results, mg. organization of establishments, non-linear size,
2012 cross-section
Unit Est. HQ
Dependent variable # mg. layers
(1) (2)
Log distance 0.031∗∗∗
to HQ (0.007)
Maximum log 0.043∗∗∗
distance to HQ (0.004)
Log # non-mg. 0.342∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗
employees (0.024) (0.014)
Log # non-mg. −0.015∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
employees, squared (0.003) (0.002)
# est./HQ 29,416 9,536
Sector FE Y Y
County FE Y Y
The table presents the estimated coefficients of Poisson regressions. Constant included. Standard
errors in parentheses (clustered by firm in column 1, robust in column 2). ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent
variable: number of managerial layers. Independent variables: see Table 5.
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Table B.8: Regression results, mg. organization of ME firms, number of establish-
ments, 2012 cross-section
Dependent variable # managerial layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1]
Layers Blossfeld
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Maximum log 0.017∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
distance to HQ (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.012)
Log area 0.025∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.013)
Log sales 0.118∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
Log # non-mg. 0.116∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
employees (0.004) (0.005)
# establishments −0.000 −0.000 −0.000∗ −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
# firms 5,111 1,661 9,275 2,768 9,275 2,768 9,275 2,768
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Legal form FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM
The table presents the coefficient estimates. Constant included. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Even columns include only ME firms with
establishments in at least two counties. Dependent variable: see Table 4. Independent variables:
# establishments: number of establishments (excluding HQ), others: see Table 4.
Table B.9: Regression results, mg. organization of ME firms, OLS, 2012 cross-
section
Dependent variable # managerial layers Mg. share (%)
Layers Blossfeld
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Maximum log 0.028∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 1.124∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
distance to HQ (0.008) (0.006) (0.168) (0.089)
Log area 0.050∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 1.325∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.236) (0.116)
Log sales 0.254∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.013)
Log # non-mg. 0.244∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
employees (0.007) (0.013)
# firms 5,066 1,529 9,253 2,673 9,253 2,673 9,253 2,673
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Legal form FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Even columns include only ME firms with
establishments in at least two counties. Dependent and independent variables: see Table 4.
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Table B.10: Regression results, mg. organization of establishments, OLS, 2012
cross-section
Unit Establishment Headquarters
Dependent variable # layers Mg. share (%) # layers Mg. share (%)
Layers Blossfeld Layers Blossfeld
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log distance 0.030∗∗∗ 2.036∗∗∗ 0.554∗
to HQ (0.006) (0.386) (0.221)
Maximum log 0.070∗∗∗ 1.715∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗
distance to HQ (0.007) (0.191) (0.123)
Log # non-mg. 0.279∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗
employees (0.008) (0.007)
# est./HQ 29,396 35,061 35,061 9,514 9,790 9,790
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by firm in columns 1 to 3, robust in columns 4 to 6). ∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent and independent variables: see Table 5.
Table B.11: Regression results, mg. organization of establishments within firms,
OLS, 2012 cross-section
Dependent variable # layers Mg. share (%)
Layers Blossfeld
(1) (2) (3)
Log distance 0.012+ 0.432∗ 0.013
to HQ (0.006) (0.202) (0.159)
Log # non-mg. 0.253∗∗∗
employees (0.009)
# est./HQ 23,698 28,828 28,828
Sector FE Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y
Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p <
0.001. Dependent and independent variables: see Table 5.
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Table B.12: Regression results, mg. organization of ME firms, 2000-2010 data
Dependent variable # managerial layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1]
Layers Blossfeld
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Maximum log 0.035∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
distance to HQ (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.014)
Log area 0.032∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.047∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.018)
Log sales 0.144∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.007)
Log # non-mg. 0.193∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
employees (0.005) (0.007)
# firm-years 22,417 7,383 40,609 12,257 40,609 12,257 40,609 12,257
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Legal form FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM
The table presents the coefficients. Constant included. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Even columns include only ME firms with at least two
establishments (plus headquarters). Dependent and independent variables: see Table 4.
Table B.13: Regression results, mg. organization of establishments, 2000-2010 data
Unit Establishment Headquarters
Dependent variable # layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1] # layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1]
Layers Blossfeld Layers Blossfeld
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log distance −0.016∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ −0.002
to HQ (0.004) (0.010) (0.018)
Maximum log 0.051∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
distance to HQ (0.004) (0.010) (0.016)
Log # non-mg. 0.351∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗
employees (0.015) (0.005)
# est./HQ-years 315,661 331,391 331,391 77,131 77,715 77,715
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM Poisson GLM
Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent and independent
variables: see Table 5.
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Table B.14: Regression results, mg. organization of ME firms, by investment motive,
2012 cross-section
Dependent variable # managerial layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1]
Layers Blossfeld
Horizontal (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Maximum log 0.021∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
distance to HQ (0.007) (0.005) (0.013) (0.017)
Log area 0.019∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.020) (0.023)
Log sales 0.128∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.011)
Log # non-mg. 0.120∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
employees (0.006) (0.012)
# firms 2,548 716 4,705 1,249 4,705 1,249 4,705 1,249
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Legal form FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM
Vertical (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Maximum log 0.012∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.021
distance to HQ(0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.016)
Log area 0.022∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.017)
Log sales 0.114∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
Log # non-mg. 0.111∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
employees (0.005) (0.006)
# firms 2,563 945 4,570 1,519 4,570 1,519 4,570 1,519
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Legal form FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM
The table presents the coefficient estimates. Constant included. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Even columns include only ME firms with establishments in at least two
counties. Dependent and independent variables: see Table 4. Horizontal restricts the sample to
firms with all establishments in the same sector as the HQ. Vertical restricts the sample to firms
with at least one establishment in a different sector than the HQ.
64
Table B.15: Regression results, mg. organization of establishments, by investment
motive, 2012 cross-section
Unit Establishment Headquarters
Dependent variable # layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1] # layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1]
Layers Blossfeld Layers Blossfeld
Horizontal (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log distance 0.040∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
to HQ (0.010) (0.026) (0.028)
Maximum log 0.045∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗
distance to HQ (0.007) (0.015) (0.022)
Log # non-mg. 0.267∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
employees (0.011) (0.007)
# est./HQ 17,248 20,454 20,454 4,844 4,983 4,983
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM Poisson GLM
Vertical (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log distance 0.021∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.041
to HQ (0.009) (0.027) (0.040)
Maximum log 0.040∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗
distance to HQ (0.006) (0.013) (0.018)
Log # non-mg. 0.252∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
employees (0.013) (0.006)
# est./HQ 12,168 14,625 14,625 4,692 4,829 4,829
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM Poisson GLM
The table presents the coefficient estimates. Constant included. Standard errors in parentheses
(clustered by firm in columns 1 to 3, robust in columns 4 to 6). ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. De-
pendent and independent variables: see Table 5. Horizontal restricts the sample to establishments
in the HQ sector and HQ of firms with all establishments in the HQ sector, respectively. Vertical
restricts the sample to establishments in a different sector than the HQ and HQ of firms with at
least one establishment in a different sector than the HQ, respectively.
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Table B.16: Regression results, mg. organization of ME firms, by legal form, 2012
cross-section
Dependent variable # managerial layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1]
Layers Blossfeld
GmbH (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Maximum log 0.070∗∗∗ 0.017+ 0.044∗ 0.031
distance to HQ (0.013) (0.010) (0.022) (0.026)
Log area 0.015 0.049∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.090∗
(0.016) (0.013) (0.033) (0.036)
Log sales 0.149∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗
(0.013) (0.018)
Log # non-mg. 0.177∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
employees (0.011) (0.024)
# firms 724 215 1,493 452 1,493 452 1,493 452
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM
GmbH & Co. KG (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Maximum log 0.014∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
distance to HQ(0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.014)
Log area 0.033∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.016)
Log sales 0.139∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007)
Log # non-mg. 0.144∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
employees (0.005) (0.008)
# firms 3,979 1,212 7,214 2,018 7,214 2,018 7,214 2,018
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM
AG (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Maximum log −0.007 −0.003 0.003 −0.066
distance to HQ(0.009) (0.011) (0.033) (0.070)
Log area −0.007 0.008 −0.004 0.014
(0.011) (0.011) (0.049) (0.056)
Log sales 0.023∗∗ 0.020+
(0.008) (0.011)
Log # non-mg. 0.050∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
employees (0.009) (0.010)
# firms 397 228 549 291 549 291 549 291
HQ sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
HQ county FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM
The tables present the coefficient estimates separately for firms with the legal form GmbH, GmbH
& Co. KG and AG. Constant included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p
< 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Even columns include only ME firms with establishments in
at least two counties. Dependent and independent variables: see Table 4. A “GmbH” is a limited
liability company. A “GmbH & Co. KGs” is a limited partnership with a limited liability company
as general partner. “AGs” are public companies.
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Table B.17: Regression results, mg. organization of establishments, by legal form,
2012 cross-section
Unit Establishment Headquarters
Dependent variable # layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1] # layers Mg. share ∈ [0, 1]
Layers Blossfeld Layers Blossfeld
GmbH (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log distance 0.044∗∗ −0.002 0.139∗∗
to HQ (0.017) (0.052) (0.050)
Maximum log 0.058∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.044
distance to HQ (0.012) (0.028) (0.046)
Log # non-mg. 0.330∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
employees (0.025) (0.013)
# est./HQ 4,746 5,304 5,304 1,464 1,493 1,493
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM Poisson GLM
GmbH & Co. KG (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log distance 0.036∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.102∗
to HQ (0.008) (0.025) (0.046)
Maximum log 0.043∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
distance to HQ (0.005) (0.012) (0.017)
Log # non-mg. 0.262∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
employees (0.011) (0.006)
# est./HQ 17,905 20,754 20,754 7,005 7,214 7,214
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Model Poisson GLM Poisson GLM
AG (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log distance 0.007 0.102∗∗ 0.037
to HQ (0.010) (0.038) (0.035)
Maximum log −0.005 −0.032 −0.069
distance to HQ (0.014) (0.042) (0.065)
Log # non-mg. 0.219∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
employees (0.021) (0.012)
# est./HQ 3,832 5,764 5,764 532 549 549
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
The tables present the coefficient estimates separately for establishments/HQ of firms with the
legal form GmbH, GmbH & Co. KG and AG. Constant included. Standard errors in parentheses
(clustered by firm in columns 1 to 3, robust in columns 4 to 6). + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p <
0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent and independent variables: see Table 4. A “GmbH” is a limited
liability company. A “GmbH & Co. KGs” is a limited partnership with a limited liability company
as general partner. “AGs” are public companies.
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B.3 Reorganization of headquarters or establishments
Table B.18: Transition dynamics of the managerial organization, SE firms, 2000-
2010 panel
# layers in t/t+ 1 0 1 2 3 ME Exit # firms
0 92 7 1 159,058
1 5 87 7 1 195,573
2 9 83 6 1 127,793
3 1 10 88 1 73,165
The table displays the percentage share of SE firms that transition from a number of managerial
layers in year t (given in the rows) to a potentially different number of layers in year t+ 1 (given
in the columns). Empty cells contain fewer than .5% of observations. Diagonal in bold.
Table B.19: Size at transition, ME firms, 2000-2010 panel
(a) firm
# layers in t/t+ 1 0 1 2 3 SE # firms
0 3.4 3.5∗∗∗ 3.8∗∗∗ 3.3∗∗∗ 10,778
1 3.6∗∗∗ 3.7 3.9∗∗∗ 4.2 3.5∗∗∗ 18,274
2 4.0∗∗∗ 4.3 4.5∗∗∗ 3.9∗∗∗ 18,754
3 4.6∗∗∗ 5.5 4.8∗∗∗ 22,391
(b) headquarters/establishments
# layers in t/t+ 1 0/0 1/0 1/1 2/<2 2/2 3/<3 3/3 SE # firms
HQ 0/ est. 0 3.4 3.6∗∗∗ 3.3∗∗∗ 10,778
HQ 1/ est. 0 3.7 3.7 3.8∗ 3.9∗∗∗ 3.5∗∗∗ 8,340
HQ 1/ est. 1 .. 3.9 3.8 4.1∗∗∗ .. 3.6∗∗∗ 8,052
HQ 2/ est. 0,1 4.0∗∗∗ 4.1∗∗∗ 4.3 4.5∗∗∗ 4.4∗∗∗ 4.0∗∗∗ 12,046
HQ 2/ est. 2 .. 4.6∗∗ 4.8 4.8 .. 4.2∗∗∗ 3,410
HQ 3/ est. 0,1,2 4.5∗∗∗ 5.0∗∗∗ 5.2 5.8∗∗∗ 4.8∗∗∗ 13,365
HQ 3/ est. 3 6.0∗∗∗ 6.7 .. 4,625
Panel (a) displays the average log number of employees of firms that transition from a number
of managerial layers in year t (given in the rows) to a potentially different number of layers in
year t + 1 (given in the columns). Panel (b) displays the average log number of employees of
firms that transition from a managerial organization in year t (given in the rows) to a potentially
different managerial organization in year t + 1 (given in the columns). The figure in front of the
slash denotes the number of layers of the headquarters. The figure behind the slash denotes the
maximum number of layers at the establishments. Firms with a higher number of layers at the
establishments than at the HQ are dropped for readability. The stars denote whether average size
of firms that change their organization is significantly different from the average size of those that
do not (marked in bold). + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. .. denotes cells with
fewer than 50 observations. Empty cells contain fewer than .5% of firms. Fewer than .5% of firms
exit. Unreported results with sales as outcome variable are similar.
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Table B.20: Transition dynamics of the managerial organization, establishment-level
layer definition, 2000-2010 panel
(a) # managerial layers of firm
# layers in t/t+ 1 0 1 2 3 SE # firms
0 85 8 1 6 10,968
1 5 82 7 6 20,327
2 8 79 7 5 18,696
3 6 90 4 20,206
(b) # managerial layers at headquarters/establishment
# layers in t/t+ 1 0/0 1/0 1/1 2/<2 2/2 3/<3 3/3 SE # firms
HQ 0/ est. 0 85 5 6 10,968
HQ 1/ est. 0 6 74 4 6 8 9,252
HQ 1/ est. 1 1 6 75 7 1 3 7,006
HQ 2/ est. 0,1 4 4 76 2 6 7 12,144
HQ 2/ est. 2 1 10 69 9 1 2 3,254
HQ 3/ est. 0,1,2 5 2 84 3 5 13,374
HQ 3/ est. 3 9 86 1 4,606
Panel (a) displays the percentage share of firms that transition from a number of managerial layers
in year t (given in the rows) to a potentially different number of layers in year t + 1 (given in
the columns). Panel (b) displays the percentage share of firms that transition from a managerial
organization in year t (given in the rows) to a potentially different managerial organization in
year t + 1 (given in the columns). The figure in front of the slash denotes the number of layers
of the headquarters. The figure behind the slash denotes the maximum number of layers at the
establishments. Firms with a higher number of layers at the establishments than at the HQ are
dropped for readability. Empty cells contain fewer than .5% of firms. Fewer than .5% of firms exit.
Diagonal in bold.
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Table B.21: Transition dynamics of the managerial organization, five-year time pe-
riod, 2000-2010 panel
(a) # managerial layers of firm
# layers in t/t+ 5 0 1 2 3 SE # firms
0 59 16 3 1 21 6,272
1 10 51 14 3 21 10,954
2 14 48 16 19 11,211
3 2 11 71 15 13,044
(b) # managerial layers at headquarters/establishment(s)
# layers in t/t+ 5 0/0 1/0 1/1 2/<2 2/2 3/<3 3/3 SE # firms
HQ 0/ est. 0 59 10 2 2 21 6,272
HQ 1/ est. 0 12 40 7 10 26 4,977
HQ 1/ est. 1 2 8 45 11 3 16 4,821
HQ 2/ est. 0,1 1 7 7 43 4 12 22 7,204
HQ 2/ est. 2 3 16 32 18 4 10 2,014
HQ 3/ est. 0,1,2 1 1 10 3 59 5 18 7,768
HQ 3/ est. 3 1 2 20 64 5 2,757
Panel (a) displays the percentage share of firms that transition from a number of managerial layers
in year t (given in the rows) to a potentially different number of layers in year t + 5 (given in
the columns). Panel (b) displays the percentage share of firms that transition from a managerial
organization in year t (given in the rows) to a potentially different managerial organization in
year t+ 5 (given in the columns). The figure in front of the slash denotes the number of layers of
the HQ. The figure behind the slash denotes the maximum number of layers of the establishments.
Firms with a higher number of layers at the establishments than at the HQ are dropped for
readability. Empty cells contain fewer than .5% of firms. Fewer than 1% of firms exit. Diagonal in
bold. Among all firms that reorganize, 42% change the number of layers only at the headquarters,
39% change it only at the establishment, and 20% change it at both.
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Table B.22: Transition dynamics of the managerial organization, by number of
establishments, 2000-2010 panel
(a) ME firms with headquarters and one establishment
# layers in t/t+ 1 0/0 1/0 1/1 2/<2 2/2 3/<3 3/3 SE # firms
HQ 0/ est. 0 83 5 8 7,945
HQ 1/ est. 0 6 74 4 6 10 6,339
HQ 1/ est. 1 4 76 7 1 6 5,330
HQ 2/ est. 0,1 4 4 74 2 6 9 8,388
HQ 2/ est. 2 . 10 68 8 . 3 1,665
HQ 3/ est. 0,1,2 5 2 83 2 8 8,276
HQ 3/ est. 3 . 11 82 2 1,410
(b) ME firms with headquarters and at least two establishments
# layers in t/t+ 1 0/0 1/0 1/1 2/<2 2/2 3/<3 3/3 SE # firms
HQ 0/ est. 0 90 5 1 2,833
HQ 1/ est. 0 8 78 5 6 . 2 2,001
HQ 1/ est. 1 . 5 77 7 . . 1 2,722
HQ 2/ est. 0,1 3 5 79 4 6 1 3,658
HQ 2/ est. 2 . 9 70 10 . 1,745
HQ 3/ est. 0,1,2 4 3 87 4 1 5,089
HQ 3/ est. 3 8 88 3,215
The table displays the percentage share of firms that transition from a managerial organization in
year t (given in the rows) to a potentially different managerial organization in year t + 1 (given
in the columns). The figure in front of the slash denotes the number of layers of the HQ. The
figure behind the slash denotes the maximum number of layers at the establishments. Firms with
a higher number of layers at the establishments than at the HQ are dropped for readability. Empty
cells contain fewer than .5% of firms. Dots mark cells that contain more than .5%, but fewer than
20 observations, so are omitted for confidentiality. Fewer than .5% of firms exit. Diagonal in bold.
Panel (a) contains firms that maintain HQ and exactly one establishment in year t. Panel (b)
contains firms that maintain HQ and at least two establishments in year t.
71
Table B.23: Transition dynamics of the managerial organization, by median maxi-
mum establishment distance, 2000-2010 panel
(a) ME firms with maximum establishment distance of up to 170 km
# layers in t/t+ 1 0/0 1/0 1/1 2/<2 2/2 3/<3 3/3 SE # firms
HQ 0/ est. 0 85 5 7 7,054
HQ 1/ est. 0 6 75 4 5 8 5,226
HQ 1/ est. 1 . 5 76 6 1 4 4,208
HQ 2/ est. 0,1 5 4 75 2 5 8 5,985
HQ 2/ est. 2 . 11 67 8 3 1,449
HQ 3/ est. 0,1,2 5 2 83 2 7 4,945
HQ 3/ est. 3 12 82 . 1,122
(b) ME firms with maximum establishment distance above 170 km
# layers in t/t+ 1 0/0 1/0 1/1 2/<2 2/2 3/<3 3/3 SE # firms
HQ 0/ est. 0 85 5 1 5 3,724
HQ 1/ est. 0 7 73 5 7 . 7 3,844
HQ 1/ est. 1 . 4 77 7 1 3 3,114
HQ 2/ est. 0,1 3 4 76 3 7 6 6,061
HQ 2/ est. 2 . 9 70 10 . 1 1,961
HQ 3/ est. 0,1,2 5 2 85 3 4 8,420
HQ 3/ est. 3 8 88 1 3,503
The table displays the percentage share of firms that transition from a managerial organization in
year t (given in the rows) to a potentially different managerial organization in year t+ 1 (given in
the columns). The figure in front of the slash denotes the number of layers of the HQ. The figure
behind the slash denotes the maximum number of layers at the establishments. Firms with a
higher number of layers at the establishments than at the HQ are dropped for readability. Empty
cells contain fewer than .5% of firms. Dots mark cells that contain more than .5%, but fewer
than 20 observations, so are omitted for confidentiality. Fewer than .5% of firms exit. Diagonal
in bold. We split the sample at the median of the maximum log distance of establishments from
the headquarters (170 km). Panel (a) contains firms with all establishments within a distance of
170 km in year t. Panel (b) contains firms with establishments above the distance of 170 km in
year t.
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C Model
C.1 Set-up
Assumption 1. The maximum value of the helping costs θj0 is .5. The predictability of
the production process λ, the helping costs θ00 and the learning costs c are such that
λθ00 > c.
C.2 Single-establishment firm organization
C.2.1 Lagrangian equation and first order conditions
We use equation (5), which is binding in optimum, to substitute for nℓ0,L, L ≥ ℓ > 0.
L = n00,Lw0
(
1 + cz00,L
)
+ n00,L
L∑
ℓ=1
θ00e
−λzℓ−10,L w0
(
1 + czℓ0,L
)
+ w0 (1 + cz¯0,L)
+ ξ0,L
(
q˜ − n00,L
(
1− e−λz¯0,L
))
+ ϕ0,L
(
n00,Lθ00e
−λzL0,L − 1
)
+ η¯L+10,L (z
L
0,L − z¯0,L) +
L∑
ℓ=1
η¯ℓ0,L(z
ℓ−1
0,L − z
ℓ
0,L)− η¯
0
0,Lz
0
0,L − η
0
0,Ln
0
0,L
∂L
∂z¯0,L
= w0c− ξ0,Ln
0
0,Lλe
−λz¯0,L − η¯L0,L = 0
∂L
∂zL0,L


L=0
= n00,0
(
w0c− ϕ0,0θ00λe
−λz00,0
)
+ η¯10,0 − η¯
0
0,0 = 0
L>0
= n00,L
(
w0cθ00e
−λzL−10,L − ϕ0,Lθ00λe
−λzL0,L
)
+ η¯L+10,L − η¯
L
0,L = 0
∂L
∂zℓ0,L
= n00,Lw0
(
cθ00e
−λzℓ−10,L − λθ00e
−λzℓ0,L(1 + czℓ+10,L )
)
− η¯ℓ0,L + η¯
ℓ+1
0,L = 0
for L > ℓ > 0, L > 1
∂L
∂z00,L
L>0
= n00,Lw0
(
c− λθ00e
−λz00,L(1 + cz10,L)
)
+ η¯10,L − η¯
0
0,L = 0
∂L
∂n00,L
= w0
(
1 + cz00,L +
L∑
ℓ=1
θ00e
−λzℓ−10,L
(
1 + czℓ0,L
))
− ξ0,L
(
1− e−λz¯0,L
)
+ ϕ0,Lθ00e
−λzL0,L − η00,L = 0
∂L
∂ξ0,L
= q˜ − n00,L
(
1− e−λz¯0,L
)
= 0
∂L
∂ϕ0,L
= n00,Lθ00e
−λzL0,L − 1 = 0
C.2.2 Proposition 1: Comparative statics
We substitute dL
dzℓ0,L
, ℓ ≤ L, into d
2L
dn00,Ldq˜
. The second order conditions are:
d2L
dz¯0,Ldq˜
= −
dξ0,L
dq˜
n00,Lλe
−λz¯0,L − ξ0,L
dn00,L
dq˜
λe−λz¯0,L + ξ0,Ln
0
0,Lλ
2e−λz¯0,L
dz¯0,L
dq˜
= 0
d2L
dzL0,Ldq˜


L=0
= −
dϕ0,0
dq˜ θ00λe
−λz00,0 + ϕ0,0θ00λ
2e−λz
0
0,0
dz00,0
dq˜ = 0
L>0
= −w0cλe
−λzL−10,L
dzL−10,L
dq˜ −
dϕ0,L
dq˜ λe
−λzL0,L + ϕ0,Lλ
2e−λz
L
0,L
dzL0,L
dq˜ = 0
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∂2L
∂zℓ0,L∂q˜
= −λce−λz
ℓ−1
0,L
dzℓ−10,L
dq˜
+ λ2e−λz
ℓ
0,L
dzℓ0,L
dq˜
(1 + czℓ+10,L )− λe
−λzℓ0,Lc
dzℓ+10,L
dq˜
= 0
for L > ℓ > 0, L > 1
d2L
dz00,Ldq˜
L>0
= λ2θ00e
−λz00,L
dz00,L
dq˜
(1 + cz10,L)− λθ00e
−λz00,Lc
dz10,L
dq˜
= 0
d2L
dn00,Ldq˜
= −
dξ0,L
dq˜
(1− e−λz¯0,L)− ξ0,Lλe
−λz¯0,L
dz¯0,L
dq˜
+
dϕ0,L
dq˜
θ00e
−λzL0,L = 0
d2L
dξ0,Ldq˜
= 1−
dn00,L
dq˜
(1− e−λz¯0,L)− n00,Lλe
−λz¯0,L
dz¯0,L
dq˜
= 0
∂2L
∂ϕ0,L∂q˜
=
dn00,L
dq˜
θ00e
−λzL0,L − n00,Lθ00λe
−λzL0,L
dzL0,L
dq˜
= 0
To show (a): The knowledge of the CEO z¯0,L increases with output q˜.
1. From d
2L
dϕ0,Ldq˜
:
dzL0,L
dq˜
=
1
λn00,L
dn00,L
dq˜
2. From d
2L
dξ0,Ldq˜
:
dn00,L
dq˜
=
1− n00,Lλe
−λz¯0,L dz¯0,L
dq˜
1− e−λz¯0,L
3. From d
2L
dn00,Ldq˜
:
dξ0,L
dq˜
=
dϕ0,L
dq˜ θ00e
−λzL0,L − ξ0,Lλe
−λz¯0,L dz¯0,L
dq˜
1− e−λz¯0,L
4. From d
2L
dzL0,Ldq˜
, with d
2L
dzℓ0,Ldq˜
, ℓ < L:
dϕ0,0
dq˜
= ϕ0,0λ
dz00,0
dq˜
≡ ϕ0,0λf0 (ϕ0,0)
dzL0,L
dq˜
dϕ0,1
dq˜
= ϕ0,1λ
dz10,1
dq˜
(1− θ00e
−λz00,1) ≡ ϕ0,1λf1 (ϕ0,1)
dzL0,L
dq˜
dϕ0,2
dq˜
= ϕ0,2λ
dz20,2
dq˜

1−
dz10,2
dq˜
dz20,2
dq˜

 ≡ ϕ0,2λf2 (ϕ0,2) dzL0,L
dq˜
fL(ϕ0,L) > 0: f0 (ϕ0,0) = 1 > 0; f1 (ϕ0,1) = 1 − θ00e
−λz00,1 > 0; f2 (ϕ0,2) = 1 −
dz10,2
dq˜
/
dz20,2
dq˜ > 0 if
dz20,2
dq˜ >
dz10,2
dq˜ . This is the case if e
−λz10,2 < e−λz
0
0,2(1−θ00e
−λz00,2) (∗).
(∗) holds for z20,2 = z
1
0,2, as we can rewrite (∗) as θ00e
−λz00,2 < 1 − θ00e
−λz00,2 for
z20,2 = z
1
0,2. (∗) holds for z
2
0,2 > z
1
0,2, as both sides of (∗) decrease in z
0
0,2 and
the left-hand side of (∗) decreases at a faster rate than the right hand-side of (∗)
at z20,2 = z
1
0,2 by −λe
−λz00,2 < −λe−λz
0
0,2(1− 2θ00e
−λz00,2).
5. Substituting into d
2L
dz¯0,Ldq˜
yields:
dz¯0,L
dq˜
=
1
n00,Lλe
−λz¯0,L
ξ0,Lλe
−λz¯0,L + λe
−λz¯0,L
1−e
−λz¯0,L
θ00e
−λzL0,Lϕ0,LfL (ϕ0,L)
ξ0,Lλe−λz¯0,L +
λe
−λz¯0,L
1−e
−λz¯0,L
θ00e
−λzL0,Lϕ0,LfL (ϕ0,L) + λξ0,L
> 0. 
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To show (a): The number nℓ0,L and the knowledge z
ℓ
0,L of employees at all below-
CEO layers ℓ ≤ L increase with output q˜.
Number of employees:
1. ℓ = 0:
dn00,L
dq˜ > 0 by
dz¯0,L
dq˜ <
1
λn00,Le
−λz¯0,L
.
2. ℓ = L, L > 0:
dnL0,L
dq˜ =
dn00,L
dq˜ θ00e
−λzL−10,L fL(ϕ0,L) > 0 by fL(ϕ0,L) > 0.
3. ℓ = 1, L = 2:
dn10,2
dq˜ > 0 by 1 > θ00(e
−λz10,2 + e−λz
0
0,2). 
Knowledge of employees:
1. ℓ = L:
dzL0,L
dq˜ =
1
λn00,L
dn00,L
dq˜ > 0 by
dn00,L
dq˜ > 0.
2. ℓ = 0, L > 0:
dz00,L
dq˜ = θ00e
−λz00,L
dz10,L
dq˜ > 0 by
dz10,L
dq˜ > 0.
3. ℓ = 1, L = 2:
dz10,2
dq˜ =
dz20,2
dq˜
e
−λz10,2
e
−λz00,2 (1−θ00e
−λz00,2 )
> 0 by
dz20,2
dq˜ =
dzL0,L
dq˜ > 0. 
To show (a): The marginal benefit of CEO time ϕ0,L increases with output q˜.
Follows from
dϕ0,L
dq˜ = ϕ0,LλfL (ϕ0,L)
dzL0,L
dq˜ > 0 by fL (ϕ0,L) > 0 and
dzL0,L
dq˜ > 0. 
To show (b): The cost function C0,L(q˜) strictly increases with output q˜.
Follows from
∂C0,L(q˜)
∂q˜ = ξ0,L > 0. 
To show (b): The average cost function AC0,L(q˜) reaches a minimum at q˜∗L where it
intersects with the marginal cost function, and converges to infinity for q˜ → 0 and q˜ →∞.
AC0,L(q˜) =
C0,L(q˜)
q˜
⇒
dAC0,L(q˜)
dq˜
=
1
q˜
(ξ0,L −AC0,L) = 0 if ξ0,L = AC0,L
d2AC0,L(q˜)
dq˜2
= −
2
q˜2
(ξ0,L −AC0,L) +
1
q˜
dξ0,L
dq˜
=
1
q˜
dξ0,L
dq˜
> 0 if ξ0,L = AC0,L
dξ0,L
dq˜ > 0 if ϕ0,LfL(ϕ0,L)θ00e
−λzL0,L > ξ0,Le
−λz¯0,L .
• For L = 0, this condition holds ∀q˜.
• For L > 0, the condition is equivalent to eλ(z
L
0,L−z
L−1
0,L ) > (fL(ϕ0,L))
−1. This condi-
tion holds for sufficiently high q˜; in particular, it holds at the MES.
lim
q˜→0
AC0,L(q˜) =∞ because C0,L(q˜) ≥ w0 and C0,L(q˜) <∞ for q˜ → 0
lim
q˜→∞
AC0,L(q˜) =∞ because lim
q˜→∞
ξ0,L =∞ by l’Hoˆpital’s rule 
C.2.3 The optimal number of layers
We follow Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012, p. 1454 et seqq.) and show that the average
cost function has a unique minimum at the minimum efficient scale q˜∗L for a given number
of below-CEO layers L. That the minimum efficient scale q˜∗L increases with the number
of below-CEO layers L follows from Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012, p. 1456-8).
We show that there exists a unique cut-point of the first-order conditions (FOCs)
and the respective condition for the minimum efficient scale (MES). We focus on positive
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solutions for the knowledge levels.
The FOCs (8) and (9) define the optimal knowledge levels recursively:
λz¯0,L − λz
L
0,L = ln
(
λz00,L +
λ
c
+ 1 + θ00
L∑
ℓ=0
e−λz
ℓ
0,L
)
− ln θ00
λz10,L − λz
0
0,L = ln
(
λz20,L +
λ
c
)
for L > 1
λz00,L = ln
(
λz10,L +
λ
c
)
+ ln θ00 for L > 0
At the MES, AC0,L = ξ0,L:
λz00,0 = ln
(
λz¯0,0 +
λ
c
)
+ ln θ00 for L = 0
λzL0,L − λz
L−1
0,L = ln
(
λz¯0,L +
λ
c
)
for L > 0
Both the FOCs and the conditions for the MES define zL0,L as (implicit) functions
of z¯0,L. The FOCs have a positive root:
zL0,L = 0 : λz¯0,L ≥ ln
(
λ
c
+ 1 + θ00
)
− ln θ00 > 0
The conditions for the MES have a positive intercept:
L = 0, z¯0,0 = 0 : λz
0
0,0 = ln
(
λθ00
c
)
> 0 by Assumption 1
L > 0, z¯0,L = 0 : λz
L
0,L − λz
L−1
0,L = ln
(
λ
c
)
> ln
(
λθ00
c
)
Both the conditions for the MES and the f.o.c.s are strictly increasing:
MES :
dzL0,L
dz¯0,L
=
1
λz¯0,L +
λ
c
1
fL(ϕ0,L)
> 0
FOC, L = 0 :
dz00,0
dz¯0,0
=
λz00,0 +
λ
c + 1 + θ00e
−λz00,0
λz00,0 +
λ
c + 1 + f0(ϕ0,0)
> 0
FOC, L = 1 :
dz10,1
dz¯0,1
=
λz00,1 +
λ
c + 1 + θ00e
−λz00,1 + θ00e
−λz10,1
λz00,1 +
λ
c + 1 + θ00e
−λz00,1 + θ00e
−λz00,1f1(ϕ0,1)
> 0
FOC, L = 2 :
dz20,2
dz¯0,2
=
λz00,2 +
λ
c + 1 + θ00
∑1
ℓ=0 e
−λzℓ0,2 + θ00e
−λz20,2
λz00,2 +
λ
c + 1 + θ00
∑1
ℓ=0 e
−λzℓ0,2 + θ00e
−λz10,2f2(ϕ0,2)
> 0
where fL(ϕ0,L) is defined in section C.2.2.
The slope of the conditions for the MES decreases continuously with z¯0,L from a value
smaller than 1 with limz¯0,L→∞ dz
L
0,L/dz¯0,L = 0. The slope of the FOCs is close to 1 with
limz¯0,L→∞ dz
L
0,L/dz¯0,L = 1. Thus, for a given number of layers L, there exists a unique
cut-point of the FOC and the condition for the MES.
Proposition 5 (see below) implies that the minimum average costs (MAC) of a single-
establishment organization with L below-CEO layers cannot exceed those of an organiza-
tion with L− 1 below-CEO layers, i.e. MAC0,L−1 ≥MAC0,L. 
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C.3 Multi-establishment firm organization
C.3.1 Lagrangian equation and first order conditions
Firm-level: CEO knowledge, allocation of CEO time and output
L =
1∑
j=0
Cj,ω(qj,ω, sj,ω, z¯0,ω) +

1− 1∑
j=0
sj,ω

w0(1 + cz¯0,ω)
+ κ¯0,ω

 1∑
j=0
sj,ω − 1

− 1∑
j=0
κj,ωsj,ω − η0,ω z¯0,ω −
1∑
j=0
φj,ωqj,ω
− ✶(q0,ω ≥ q˜0 ∧ q1,ω ≤ q˜1)φ¯0,ω(q0,ω − q˜0 − τ(q˜1 − q1,ω))
− ✶(q1,ω ≥ q˜1 ∧ q0,ω ≤ q˜0)φ0,ω(q1,ω − q˜1 − τ(q˜0 − q0,ω))
First-order conditions:
∂L
∂q0,ω
=
∂C0,ω
∂q0,ω
− ✶(q0,ω ≥ q˜0 ∧ q1,ω ≤ q˜1)φ¯0,ω − ✶(q1,ω ≥ q˜1 ∧ q0,ω ≤ q˜0)φ0,ωτ − φ0,ω = 0
∂L
∂q1,ω
=
∂C1,ω
∂q1,ω
− ✶(q0,ω ≥ q˜0 ∧ q1,ω ≤ q˜1)φ¯0,ωτ − ✶(q1,ω ≥ q˜1 ∧ q0,ω ≤ q˜0)φ0,ω − φ1,ω = 0
∂L
∂sj,ω
=
∂Cj,ω
∂sj,ω
− w0(1 + cz¯0,ω) + κ¯0,ω − κj,ω = 0
∂L
∂z¯0,ω
=
∑1
j=0
∂Cj,ω
∂z¯0,ω
+ w0c(1− s0,ω − s1,ω)− η0,ω = 0
∂L
∂κ¯0,ω
= s0,ω + s1,ω − 1 = 0
∂L
∂φ¯0,ω
= −✶(q0,ω ≥ q˜0 ∧ q1,ω ≤ q˜1)(q0,ω − q˜0 + τ(q1,ω − q˜1)) = 0
∂L
∂φ
0,ω
= −✶(q1,ω ≥ q˜1 ∧ q0,ω ≤ q˜0)(q1,ω − q˜1 + τ(q0,ω − q˜0)) = 0
Establishment-level: Number and knowledge of employees. We use equa-
tion (17), which is binding in optimum, to substitute for nℓj,L, ℓ > 0.
L = n0j,ωwj
(
1 + cz0j,ω
)
+ n0j,ω
Lj∑
ℓ=1
θjje
−λzℓ−1j,ω wj
(
1 + czℓj,ω
)
+ sj,ωw0 (1 + cz¯0,ω)
+ ξj,ω
(
qj,ω − n
0
j,ω
(
1− e−λz¯0,ω
))
+ ϕj,ω
(
n0j,ωθj0e
−λz
Lj
j,ω − sj,ω
)
+ η¯
Lj+1
j,ω (z
Lj
j,ω − z¯0,ω) +
Lj∑
ℓ=1
η¯ℓj,ω(z
ℓ−1
j,ω − z
ℓ
j,ω)− η¯
0
j,ωz
0
j,ω − η
0
j,ωn
0
j,ω
∂L
∂z
Lj
j,ω


Lj=0
= n0j,ω
(
wjc− ϕj,ωθj0λe
−λz0j,ω
)
+ η¯1j,ω − η¯
0
j,ω = 0
Lj>0
= n0j,ω
(
wjcθjje
−λz
Lj−1
j,ω − ϕj,ωθj0λe
−λz
Lj
j,ω
)
+ η¯
Lj+1
j,ω − η¯
Lj
j,ω = 0
∂L
∂zℓj,ω
= n0j,ωwj
(
cθjje
−λzℓ−1j,ω − λθjje
−λzℓj,ω(1 + czℓ+1j,ω )
)
+ η¯ℓ+1j,ω − η¯
ℓ
j,ω = 0
for 0 < ℓ < Lj − 1, Lj > 1
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∂L
∂z0j,ω
Lj>0
= n0j,ωwj
(
c− λθjje
−λz0j,ω(1 + cz1j,ω)
)
+ η¯1j,ω − η¯
0
j,ω = 0
∂L
∂n0j,ω
= wj

1 + cz0j,ω +
Lj∑
ℓ=1
θjje
−λzℓ−1j,ω
(
1 + czℓj,ω
)
− ξj,ω
(
1− e−λz¯0,ω
)
+ ϕj,ωθj0e
−λz
Lj
j,ω − η0j,ω = 0
∂L
∂ξj,ω
= qj,ω − n
0
j,ω
(
1− e−λz¯0,ω
)
= 0
∂L
∂ϕj,ω
= n0j,ωθj0e
−λz
Lj
j,ω − sj,ω = 0
Endogenous variables:
eλz
Lj
j,ω =
qj,ω
1− e−λz¯0,ω
θj0
sj,ω
eλ(z
ℓ−1
j,ω −z
ℓ−2
j,ω ) =
(
1 + czℓj,ω
) λ
c
∀ℓ = 2, ..., Lj
eλz
0
j,ω =
(
1 + cz1j,ω
) λ
c
θjj for Lj > 0
ξj,ω =
wj
(
1 + cz0j,ω +
c
λ + ✶(Lj ≥ 1)θjj
c
λ
∑Lj
ℓ=1 e
−λzℓ−1j,ω
)
1− e−λz¯0,ω
ϕj,ω =
wjc
λθj0
θjje
λ
(
z
Lj
j,ω−z
Lj−1
j,ω
)
for Lj > 0, ϕj,ω =
wjc
λθj0
eλz
0
j,ω for Lj = 0
C.3.2 Proposition 2: Allocation of output and CEO time
To show: In optimum, ϕ0,ω = ϕ1,ω.
∂L
∂sj,ω
: If κj,ω = 0∀j, i.e. if the CEO spends positive time on both establishments,
κ0,ω =
∂C
∂s0,ω
− w0(1 + cz¯0,ω) + κ¯0,ω =
κ1,ω =
∂C
∂s1,ω
− w0(1 + cz¯0,ω) + κ¯0,ω = 0 for s0,ω, s1,ω > 0
⇒ ϕ0,ω = ϕ1,ω. 
To show: In optimum, τξ0,ω = ξ1,ω if q0,ω = q˜0 + τ(q˜1 − q1,ω), ξ0,ω = τξ1,ω if q1,ω =
q˜1 + τ(q˜0 − q0,ω) and ξ0,ω < τξ1,ω ∧ ξ1,ω < τξ0,ω if q1,ω = q˜1 ∧ q0,ω = q˜0.
∂L
∂qj,ω
: If φj,ω = 0∀j, i.e. if there is positive production at both establishments,
ξ1,ω = τξ0,ω if q0,ω > q˜0 ∧ q1,ω < q˜1 by φ0,ω = 0, φ¯0,ω = ξ0,ω = τ
−1ξ1,ω
ξ0,ω = τξ1,ω if q1,ω > q˜1 ∧ q0,ω < q˜0 by φ¯0,ω = 0, φ0,ω = τ
−1ξ0,ω = ξ1,ω
τ−1ξ1,ω < ξ0,ω ∧ ξ0,ω < τξ1,ω if q0,ω = q˜0 ∧ q1,ω = q˜1 by φ0,ω 6= 0 ∧ φ¯0,ω 6= 0
If ∃j s.t. φj,ω > 0, ξj,ω > τξ−j,ω at qj,ω = 0. 
To show: If τ = 1, in optimum, ξ0,ω = ξ1,ω.
∂L
∂qj,ω
for τ = 1: If φj,ω = 0∀j, i.e. if there is positive production at both establishments,
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φ0,ω =
∂C
∂q0,ω
− ✶(q0,ω ≥ q˜0 ∧ q1,ω ≤ q˜1)φ¯0,ω − ✶(q1,ω ≥ q˜1 ∧ q0,ω ≤ q˜0)φ0,ω
=
∂C
∂q1,ω
− ✶(q0,ω ≥ q˜0 ∧ q1,ω ≤ q˜1)φ¯0,ω − ✶(q1,ω ≥ q˜1 ∧ q0,ω ≤ q˜0)φ0,ω = φ1,ω = 0
for q0,ω, q1,ω > 0
⇒
∂C
∂q0,ω
= ξ0,ω = ξ1,ω =
∂C
∂q1,ω
. 
C.3.3 Proposition 3: Comparative statics with respect to q˜j
We substitute dL
dzℓk,ω
, ℓ ≤ Lk, into
d2L
dn0k,ωdq˜j
. We assume that ξj,ω 6= τξk,ω, j 6= k and
qj,ω, sj,ω > 0 ∀j. The second order conditions are, with k, j ∈ {0, 1}:
d2L
dq0,ωdq˜j
=
dξ0,ω
dq˜j
−
dφ¯0,ω
dq˜j
− τ
dφ
0,ω
dq˜j
= 0
d2L
dq1,ωdq˜j
=
dξ1,ω
dq˜j
− τ
dφ¯0,ω
dq˜j
−
dφ
0,ω
dq˜j
= 0
d2L
ds0,ωdq˜j
−
d2L
ds1,ωdq˜j
=
dϕ0,ω
dq˜j
−
dϕ1,ω
dq˜j
= 0
d2L
dz¯0,ωdq˜j
= −
1∑
k=0
dξk,ω
dq˜j
n0k,ωλe
−λz¯0,ω −
1∑
k=0
ξk,ω
dn0k,ω
dq˜j
λe−λz¯0,ω
+
1∑
k=0
ξk,ωn
0
k,ωλ
2e−λz¯0,ω
dz¯0,ω
dq˜j
= 0
d2L
dκ¯0,ωdq˜j
=
ds0,ω
dq˜j
+
ds1,ω
dq˜j
= 0
d2L
dφ¯0,ωdq˜j
= ✶(q0,ω ≥ q˜0 ∧ q1,ω ≤ q˜1)
(
✶(j = 0)1 + ✶(j = 1)τ −
dq0,ω
dq˜j
− τ
dq1,ω
dq˜j
)
= 0
d2L
dφ
0,ω
dq˜j
= ✶(q1,ω ≥ q˜1 ∧ q0,ω ≤ q˜0)
(
✶(j = 1)1 + ✶(j = 0)τ − τ
dq0,ω
dq˜j
−
dq1,ω
dq˜j
)
= 0
d2L
dzLkk,ωdq˜j


Lk=0= −
dϕk,ω
dq˜j
θk0λe
−λz0k,ω + ϕk,ωθk0λ
2e−λz
0
k,ω
dz0k,ω
dq˜j
= 0
Lk>0= −wkcθkkλe
−λz
Lk−1
k,ω
dz
Lk−1
k,ω
dq˜j
−
dϕk,ω
dq˜j
θk0λe
−λz
Lk
k,ω + ϕk,ωθk0λ
2e−λz
Lk
k,ω
dz
Lk
k,ω
dq˜j
= 0
d2L
dzℓk,ωdq˜j
= −λce−λz
ℓ−1
k,ω
dzℓ−1k,ω
dq˜j
+ λ2e−λz
ℓ
k,ω
dzℓk,ω
dq˜j
(1 + czℓ+1k,ω )− λe
−λzℓk,ωc
dzℓ+1k,ω
dq˜j
= 0
for 0 < ℓ < Lk, Lk > 1
d2L
dz0k,ωdq˜j
Lk>0= λ2θkke
−λz0k,ω
dz0k,ω
dq˜j
(1 + cz1k,ω)− λθkke
−λz0k,ωc
dz1k,ω
dq˜j
= 0
d2L
dn0k,ωdq˜j
= −
dξk,ω
dq˜j
(1− e−λz¯0,ω)− ξk,ωλe
−λz¯0,ω
dz¯0,ω
dq˜j
+
dϕk,ω
dq˜j
θk0e
−λz
Lk
k,ω = 0
d2L
dξk,ωdq˜j
=
dqk,ω
dq˜j
−
dn0k,ω
dq˜j
(1− e−λz¯0,ω)− n0k,ωλe
−λz¯0,ω
dz¯0,ω
dq˜j
= 0
d2L
dϕk,ωdq˜j
=
dn0k,ω
dq˜j
θk0e
−λz
Lk
k,ω − n0k,ωθk0λe
−λz
Lk
k,ω
dzLkk,ω
dq˜j
−
dsk,ω
dq˜j
= 0
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To show: CEO knowledge z¯0,ω increases with local output q˜j .
1. d
2L
dκ¯0,ωdq˜j
, d
2L
dsk,ωdq˜j
, d
2L
dz
Lk
k,ωdq˜j
, d
2L
dξk,ωdq˜j
and d
2L
dϕk,ωdq˜j
, k = 0, 1 imply:
dϕ0,ω
dq˜j
= ϕ0,ω
θj0e
−λz
Lj
j,ω − λe−λz¯0,ω
dz¯0,ω
dq˜j
(1− e−λz¯0,ω)
∑1
k=0
sk,ω
fk,ω(ϕ0,ω)
fk,ω(ϕ0,ω) = 1 if Lk = 0, fk,ω(ϕ0,ω) = 1 − θkke
−λz0k,ω if Lk = 1 and fk,ω(ϕ0,ω) =
1− e
−λz1k,ω/
[
e
−λz0k,ω
(
1−θkke
−λz0k,ω
)]
if Lk = 2. fk,ω(ϕ0,ω) > 0 (see section C.2.2).
2. From d
2L
dn0k,ωdq˜j
:
dξk,ω
dq˜j
=
1
1− e−λz¯0,ω
(
dϕ0,ω
dq˜j
θk0e
−λz
Lk
k,ω − ξk,ωλe
−λz¯0,ω
dz¯0,ω
dq˜j
)
3. Inserting
dξk,ω
dq˜j
and
dn0k,ω
dq˜j
from d
2L
dξk,ωdq˜j
into d
2L
dz¯0,ωdq˜j
yields:
dz¯0,ω
dq˜j
=
ϕ0,ωθj0e
−λz
Lj
j,ω
1−e−λz¯0,ω
+ ξj,ω
∑1
k=0
sk,ω
fk,ω(ϕ0,ω)
λ(1 + e−λz¯0,ω)
∑1
k=0
sk,ω
fk,ω(ϕ0,ω)
∑1
k=0 ξk,ωn
0
k,ω + ϕ0,ω
λe−λz¯0,ω
1−e−λz¯0,ω
> 0 
To show: Higher local output q˜j increases (decreases) the number of production
workers at the same (other) location n0j,ω (n
0
k,ω, k 6= j).
From d
2L
dξk,ωdq˜j
j, k = 0, 1:
dn0k,ω
dq˜j
=
1
1− e−λz¯0,ω
(
dqk,ω
dq˜j
− n0k,ωλe
−λz¯0,ω
dz¯0,ω
dq˜j
)
By ξj,ω 6= τξk,ω,
dqk,ω
dq˜j
= 0, so
dn0k,ω
dq˜j
< 0.
dqj,ω
dq˜j
= 1 and
dz¯0,ω
dq˜j
< 1
n0j,ωλe
−λz¯0,ω
, so
dn0k,ω
dq˜j
< 0.
To show: The knowledge of the employees at all below-CEO layers zℓk,ω, ℓ ≤ Lk, k =
0, 1 and the marginal benefit of CEO time ϕk,ω increase with local output q˜j if the CEO
spends a sufficient share of time on location j.
From above:
dϕ0,ω
dq˜j
= ϕ0,ω
θj0e
−λz
Lj
j,ω − λe−λz¯0,ω
dz¯0,ω
dq˜j
(1− e−λz¯0,ω)
∑1
k=0
sk,ω
fk,ω(ϕ0,ω)
> 0 if
θj0e
−λz
Lj
j,ω
λe−λz¯0,ω
>
dz¯0,ω
dq˜j
This is the case if
1∑
k=0
ξk,ωn
0
k,ω(1 + e
λz¯0,ω) > ξj,ω
1
θj0
eλz
Lj
j,ω ,
which holds whenever sj,ω ≥ 1/1+eλz¯0,ω (sufficient, not necessary).
The positive impact of higher local output on knowledge follows from:
dzLkk,ω
dq˜j
Lk=0=
1
ϕ0,ωλ
dϕ0,ω
dq˜j
dzLkk,ω
dq˜j
−
dzLk−1k,ω
dq˜j
Lk>0=
1
ϕ0,ωλ
dϕ0,ω
dq˜j
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C.3.4 Proposition 4: Comparative statics with respect to θ10
We substitute dL
dzℓj,ω
, ℓ ≤ Lj , into
d2L
dn0j,ωdθ10
. We assume that ξj,ω 6= τξk,ω, j 6= k and
qj,ω, sj,ω > 0 ∀j. The second order conditions are, with j ∈ {0, 1}:
d2L
dq0,ωdθ10
=
dξ0,ω
dθ10
−
dφ¯0,ω
dθ10
− τ
dφ
0,ω
dθ10
= 0
d2L
dq1,ωdθ10
=
dξ1,ω
dθ10
− τ
dφ¯0,ω
dθ10
−
dφ
0,ω
dθ10
= 0
d2L
ds0,ωdθ10
−
d2L
ds1,ωdθ10
=
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
−
dϕ1,ω
dθ10
= 0
d2L
dz¯0,ωdθ10
= −
1∑
j=0
dξj,ω
dθ10
n0j,ωλe
−λz¯0,ω −
1∑
j=0
ξj,ω
dn0j,ω
dθ10
λe−λz¯0,ω +
1∑
j=0
ξj,ωn
0
j,ωλ
2e−λz¯0,ω
dz¯0,ω
dθ10
= 0
d2L
dκ¯0,ωdθ10
=
ds0,ω
dθ10
+
ds1,ω
dθ10
= 0
d2L
dφ¯0,ωdθ10
= ✶(q0,ω ≥ q˜0 ∧ q1,ω ≤ q˜1)
(
dq0,ω
dθ10
+ τ
dq1,ω
dθ10
)
= 0
d2L
dφ
0,ω
dθ10
= ✶(q1,ω ≥ q˜1 ∧ q0,ω ≤ q˜0)
(
τ
dq0,ω
dθ10
+
dq1,ω
dθ10
)
= 0
d2L
dzL00,ωdθ10


L0=0= −
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
θ00λe
−λz00,ω + ϕ0,ωθ00λ
2e−λz
0
0,ω
dz00,ω
dθ10
= 0
L0>0= −w0cλθ00e
−λz
L0−1
0,ω
dz
L0−1
0,ω
dθ10
−
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
λθ00e
−λz
L0
0,ω + ϕ0,ωθ00λ
2e−λz
L0
0,ω
dz
L0
0,ω
dθ10
= 0
d2L
dzL11,ωdθ10


L1=0= −
dϕ1,ω
dθ10
θ10λe
−λz01,ω + ϕ1,ωθ10λ
2e−λz
0
1,ω
dz01,ω
dθ10
− ϕ1,ωλe
−λz01,ω = 0
L0>0= −w1cλθ11e
−λz
L1−1
1,ω
dz
L1−1
1,ω
dθ10
−
dϕ1,ω
dθ10
λθ10e
−λz
L1
1,ω + ϕ1,ωθ10λ
2e−λz
L1
1,ω
dz
L1
1,ω
dθ10
−ϕ1,ωλe
−λz
L1
1,ω = 0
d2L
dzℓj,ωdθ10
= −λce−λz
ℓ−1
j,ω
dzℓ−1j,ω
dθ10
+ λ2e−λz
ℓ
j,ω
dzℓj,ω
dθ10
(1 + czℓ+1j,ω )− λe
−λzℓj,ωc
dzℓ+1j,ω
dθ10
= 0
for 0 < ℓ < Lj , Lj > 1
d2L
dz0j,ωdθ10
Lj>0
= λ2θjje
−λz0j,ω
dz0j,ω
dθ10
(1 + cz1j,ω)− λθjje
−λz0j,ωc
dz1j,ω
dθ10
= 0
d2L
dn00,ωdθ10
= −
dξ0,ω
dθ10
(1− e−λz¯0,ω)− ξ0,ωλe
−λz¯0,ω
dz¯0,ω
dθ10
+
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
θ00e
−λz
L0
0,ω = 0
d2L
dn01,ωdθ10
= −
dξ1,ω
dθ10
(1− e−λz¯0,ω)− ξ1,ωλe
−λz¯0,ω
dz¯0,ω
dθ10
+
dϕ1,ω
dθ10
θ10e
−λz
L1
1,ω + ϕ1,ωe
−λz
L1
1,ω = 0
d2L
dξj,ωdθ10
=
dqj,ω
dθ10
−
dn0j,ω
dθ10
(1− e−λz¯0,ω)− n0j,ωλe
−λz¯0,ω
dz¯0,ω
dθ10
= 0
d2L
dϕ0,ωdθ10
=
dn00,ω
dθ10
θ00e
−λz
L0
0,ω − n00,ωθ00λe
−λz
L0
0,ω
dzL00,ω
dθ10
−
ds0,ω
dθ10
= 0
d2L
dϕ1,ωdθ10
=
dn01,ω
dθ10
θ10e
−λz
L1
1,ω − n01,ωθ10λe
−λz
L1
1,ω
dzL11,ω
dθ10
−
ds1,ω
dθ10
+ n01,ωe
−λz
L1
1,ω = 0
To show (a): CEO knowledge z¯0,ω increases with the helping costs θ10 if L1 ≤ 1
or if L1 = 2 the establishment’s share of CEO time is sufficiently high s1,ω ≥ 1− f1(ϕ0,ω).
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1. d
2L
dκ¯0,ωdθ10
, d
2L
dsj,ωdθ10
, d
2L
dz
Lj
j,ωdθ10
, d
2L
dξj,ωdθ10
and d
2L
dϕj,ωdθ10
, j = 0, 1 imply:
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
= ϕ0,ω
s1,ω
θ10
(
f1,ω(ϕ0,ω)−1
f1,ω(ϕ0,ω)
)
− λe
−λz¯0,ω
1−e−λz¯0,ω
dz¯0,ω
dθ10∑1
j=0
sj,ω
fj,ω(ϕ0,ω)
where fj,ω(ϕ0,ω) = 1 if Lj = 0, fj,ω(ϕ0,ω) = 1− θjje
−λz0j,ω if Lj = 1 and fj,ω(ϕ0,ω) =
1− e
−λz1j,ω/
[
e
−λz0j,ω
(
1−θjje
−λz0j,ω
)]
if Lj = 2.
2. From d
2L
dn0j,ωdθ10
:
dξj,ω
dθ10
=
1
1− e−λz¯0,ω
(
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
θj0e
−λz
Lj
j,ω − ξj,ωλe
−λz¯0,ω
dz¯0,ω
dθ10
+ ✶(j = 1)ϕ1,ωe
−λz
L1
1,ω
)
3. Inserting
dξj,ω
dθ10
and
dn0j,ω
dθ10
from d
2L
dξj,ωdθ10
into d
2L
dz¯0,ωdθ10
yields:
dz¯0,ω
dθ10
= ϕ0,ωn
0
1,ωe
−λz
L1
1,ω
∑1
j=0
sj,ω
fj,ω(ϕ0,ω)
+
f1,ω(ϕ0,ω)−1
f1,ω(ϕ0,ω)
λ(1 + e−λz¯0,ω)
∑1
j=0
sj,ω
fj,ω(ϕ0,ω)
∑1
j=0 ξj,ωn
0
j,ω + ϕ0,ω
λe−λz¯0,ω
1−e−λz¯0,ω
The denominator is positive, so the sign depends on the numerator.
dz¯0,ω
dθ10
> 0
for L1 = 0 because f1,ω(ϕ0,ω) = 1, for L1 = 1 because
∑1
j=0
sj,ω
fj,ω(ϕ0,ω)
> 1 >
1−f1,ω(ϕ0,ω)
f1,ω(ϕ0,ω)
by θ11e
−λz01,ω ≤ 0.5 ≤ 1− θ11e
−λz01,ω , and for L1 = 2 if
∑1
j=0
sj,ω
fj,ω(ϕ0,ω)
>
1−f1,ω(ϕ0,ω)
f1,ω(ϕ0,ω)
, which holds if s1,ω > 1− f1,ω(ϕ0,ω) (sufficient, not necessary). 
To show (b): The marginal benefit of CEO time ϕ0,ω decreases with the helping
costs θ10 if L1 ≤ 1 or the establishment’s share of CEO time is sufficiently high s1,ω ≥
1− f1(ϕ0,ω).
Follows from f1,ω(ϕ0,ω)− 1 ≤ 0,
dz¯0,ω
dθ10
> 0 and
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
=
dϕ1,ω
dθ10
. 
To show (a, b): The knowledge of the employees at all below-CEO layers zℓj,ω, ℓ ≤
Lj increases with the helping costs θ10 at the establishment and decreases with the help-
ing costs θ10 at the headquarters if L1 ≤ 1 or the establishment share of CEO time is
sufficiently high s1,ω ≥ 1− f1(ϕ0,ω).
d2L
dz
Lj
j,ωdθ10
yields:
dzL00,ω
dθ10
L0=0=
1
ϕ0,ωλ
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
dzL11,ω
dθ10
L1=0=
1
ϕ1,ωλ
dϕ1,ω
dθ10
+
1
λθ10
dzL00,ω
dθ10
−
dzL0−10,ω
dθ10
L0>0=
1
ϕ0,ωλ
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
dzL11,ω
dθ10
−
dzL1−11,ω
dθ10
L1>0=
1
ϕ1,ωλ
dϕ1,ω
dθ10
+
1
λθ10
dzℓ0,ω
dθ10
< 0 follows from
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
< 0 with d
2L
dzℓj,ωdθ10
for ℓ < L0.
dzℓ1,ω
dθ10
> 0 results because
ϕ1,ω
θ10
> −
dϕ1,ω
dθ10
. 
To show (a, b): The number of production workers n0j,ω decreases with the helping
costs θ10 if L1 ≤ 1 or the establishment share of CEO time is sufficiently high s1,ω ≥
1− f1(ϕ0,ω).
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Follows from d
2L
dξj,ωdθ10
with
dqj,ω
dθ10
= 0 and
dz¯0,ω
dθ10
> 0. In result, the total number of produc-
tion workers decreases. 
To show (a, b): The marginal production costs ξj,ω increases with the helping
costs θ10 at the establishment and decreases with the helping costs θ10 at the headquarters.
• j = 1: Follows because ϕ1,ωe
−λz
L1
1,ω > ξj,ωλe
−λz¯0,ω dz¯0,ω
dθ10
−
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
θj0e
−λz
Lj
j,ω , which re-
sults after substituting for
dz¯0,ω
dθ10
and
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
because s1,ω
1−f1,ω(ϕ0,ω)
f1,ω(ϕ0,ω)
<
∑1
j=0
sj,ω
fj,ω(ϕ0,ω)
.
• j = 0: Follows from
dϕ0,ω
dθ10
< 0 and
dz¯0,ω
dθ10
> 0 for L1 ≤ 1. For L1 = 2, a little
algebra shows that the result holds if
∑1
j=0
sj,ω
fj,ω(ϕ0,ω)
> s1,ω
1−f1,ω(ϕ0,ω)
f1,ω(ϕ0,ω)
, which holds
by s1,ω > s1,ω(1− f1,ω(ϕ0,ω)). 
C.3.5 Proposition 5: The optimal number of layers
Parameter conditions: w1 = w0, θ10 = θ00, τ = 1.
a) To show: The average cost function of the L0/L0-organization is U-shaped in
output and reaches a minimum at q˜∗L0/L0 .
The firm with the L0/L0-organization chooses the same knowledge levels in the
headquarters and the establishment by ξ0,L0/L0 = ξ1,L0/L0 , ϕ0,L0/L0 = ϕ1,L0/L0 and
w1 = w0, θ10 = θ00. The cost function is equal to the cost function of a single
establishment firm with n00,L0+1 =
∑1
j=0 n
0
j,L0/L0
, so Proposition 1b) applies.
b) To show): The average cost of the L0/L0 + 1-organization and the L0 + 1/L0-
organization coincide.
Follows from w1 = w0, θ10 = θ00.
To show: The average cost of the L0/L0+1-organization and the L0/L0-organization
are equal at q˜∗L0/L0 .
Follows from q0,0/1 = q˜
∗
0/0, q0,0/1 = 0 at q˜
∗
0/0.
To show: The average cost function of the L0/L0 + 1-organization decreases with
output q˜ for q˜∗L0+1/L0+1 > q˜ > q˜
∗
L0/L0
.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we choose L0 = 0. The proof proceeds
in two steps. First, we construct a ME firm organization with 0/1 below-CEO layers
and fixed knowledge levels at the minimum efficient scale of the 0/0 organization q˜∗0/0
and show that the organization produces q˜ ∈ [q˜∗0/0, q˜
MAX ] with constant costs. Sec-
ond, we show that the average cost function of the organization with 0/1 below-CEO
layers and endogenous knowledge levels decreases with output for q˜ ∈ [q˜∗0/0, q˜
∗
1/1), so
it is lower than the average cost function of the organization with fixed knowledge
levels. Figure C.1 illustrates the argument.
1. We construct an ME organization with L0 = 0 below-CEO layers at the head-
quarters and L1 = 1 below-CEO layer at the establishment that has the same
average cost as an ME organization with L1 = L0 = 0 below-CEO layers at
the minimum efficient scale q˜∗0/0.
The knowledge levels of the 0/0-organization coincide with the knowledge levels
of a single establishment firm with no below-CEO layer (i.e., L = 0). Thus, at
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Figure C.1: Illustration: Proof of Proposition 5.
The figure illustrates part b) of the proof of Proposition 5. Parameter values: cλ = .225, θ10 =
θ00 = .26 (from Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012), w0 = w1 = 1. The solid line refers to
an organization with 0/0 below-CEO layers. The dashed lines show the average cost functions
of organizations with 0/1 below-CEO layers. The light line refers to the organization with fixed
knowledge levels, the bold line to the organization with endogenous knowledge levels.
the minimum efficient scale q˜∗0/0,
ξ0,0/0 = ξ0,0 = AC0,0 ≡ AC
MES
0,0 (C.1)
λz00,0/0 = λz
0
0,0 = ln
(
λz¯0,0 +
λ
c
)
+ ln θ00 ≡ λz
0MES
0,0 (C.2)
λz¯0,0/0 = λz¯0,0 = λz
0
0,0 + ln
(
λz00,0 +
λ
c
+ 1 + θ00e
−λz00,0
)
− ln θ00 ≡ λz¯
MES
0,0
(C.3)
q˜∗0,0/0 = q˜
∗
0,0 =
1
θ00
eλz
0
0,0(1− e−λz¯0,0) (C.4)
Fix the knowledge levels of an ME firm with organization ω = 0/1 such that
z00,0/1 = z
0MES
0,0 (C.5)
z¯0,0/1 = z¯
MES
0,0 (C.6)
1 + cz0MES0,0 +
c
λ
= 1 + cz01,0/1 +
c
λ
+
c
λ
θ11e
−λz0
1,0/1 , i.e. ξ1,0/1 = ξ0,0, (C.7)
and eλz
0MES
0,0 = θ11e
λ(z1
1,0/1
−z0
1,0/1
)
, i.e. ϕ1,0/1 = ϕ0,0, (C.8)
with z11,0/1 =
1
λθ11
e
λz0
1,0/1 −
1
c
.
By construction, the average cost of the ME firm at q˜∗0/0 are AC0,0/1 = AC
MES
0,0 .
The maximum producible quantity q˜MAX of the ME firm with organization ω =
0/1 and fixed knowledge levels is given by
q˜MAX =
1
θ00
e
λz1
1,0/1(1− e−λz¯
MES
0,0 ) (C.9)
At q˜MAX ,
ξ1,0/1 =ξ0,0/1 = ξ0,0 by construction (C.10)
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AC0,0/1 =w0
1 + cz01,0/1 +
c
λ + θ00e
−λz1
1,0/1(1 + cz¯MES0,0 )
1− e−λz¯
MES
0,0
=ξ0,0/1 − w0
c
λθ11e
−λz0
1,0/1 − θ00e
−λz1
1,0/1(1 + cz¯MES0,0 )
1− e−λz¯
MES
0,0
ϕ0,0/1=ϕ1,0/1
= ξ0,0/1 − w0
θ00
c
λe
−λz0
1,0/1e−λz
0MES
0,0
(
e
λz0
0,0/1 − θ00
(
λ
c + λz¯
MES
0,0
))
1− e−λz¯
MES
0,0
=ξ0,0/1 = AC
MES
0,0 by (C.2) (C.11)
i.e. the ME firm produces both q˜∗0/0 and q˜
MAX at the same average costs.
The ME firm produces output q˜ with q˜MAX ≥ q˜ ≥ q˜∗0/0 by allocating the share
s of output to the headquarters and the share 1−s to the establishment, where
s =
q˜ − 1θ00 e
λz1
1,0/1(1− e−λz¯
MES
0,0 )
1
θ00
eλz
0MES
0,0 (1− e−λz¯
MES
0,0 )− 1θ00 e
λz1
1,0/1(1− e−λz¯
MES
0,0 )
(C.12)
The numerator and denominator are negative. The denominator is constant.
0 ≤ s ≤ 1, because the numerator achieves its minimum at q˜ = 1θ00 e
λz0MES0,0 (1−
e−λz¯
MES
0,0 ) (s = 1), and its maximum at q˜ = 1θ00 e
λz1
1,0/1(1− e−λz¯
MES
0,0 ) (s = 0).
That is, the average cost function of the ME firm with fixed knowledge levels
is flat for q˜ ∈
[
q˜∗0/0, q˜
MAX
]
(see the light dashed line in Figure C.1). 
2. We show that the average cost function of an ME firm with organization ω =
0/1 and optimal knowledge levels decreases and is thus lower than the minimum
average costs of the ME firm with 0/0 below-CEO layers for q˜ > q˜∗0/0, because
it is lower than the average cost an ME firm with organization ω = 0/1 and
fixed knowledge levels.
The average cost of an ME firm with organization ω = 0/1 and optimal knowl-
edge levels is lower than the average cost of the ME firm with organization ω
but fixed knowledge levels (compare the light and bold dashed line in Fig-
ure C.1) because
C(q˜) ≤ C(q˜, z¯MES0,1 , z
0MES
0,1 , z
0
1,0/1(z
0MES
0,1 ), z
1
1,0/1(z
0MES
0,1 )). (C.13)
The average cost function AC0,0/1(q˜) decreases with output q˜ for q˜
∗
1/1 > q˜ >
q˜∗0/0 by:
dAC0,ω(q˜)
dq˜
=
1
q˜
(ξ0,ω −AC0,ω) < 0 if ξ0,ω < AC0,ω
ξ0,0/1 = ξ1,0/1 < AC0,0/1 if ϕ0,0/1 = ϕ1,0/1 < w0(1 + cz¯0,0/1) (C.14)
ϕj,0/1 is constant; z¯0,0/1 increases with q˜ by Proposition C.1. The maximum
value of AC0,0/1(q˜) is AC(q˜, z¯
MES
0,1 , z
0MES
0,1 , z
0
1,0/1(z
0MES
0,1 ), z
1
1,0/1(z
0MES
0,1 )) =
ACMES0,0 . At q˜
∗
0/0, ξ0,0/1 = AC0,0; ξ0,0/1 decreases with q˜ for q˜
1/1
0/1 > q˜ > q˜
∗
0/0.
The average cost function AC0,1/1(q˜) decreases for q˜
∗
1/1 > q˜ ≥ q˜
1/1
0/1 by Propo-
sition 5a). 
c) To show: The average cost function of the L0+1/L0+1-organization intersects the
average cost function of the L0/L0-organization at the output q˜
L0+1/L0+1
L0/L0
between
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the minimum efficient scales, i.e., q∗L0+1/L0+1 > q˜
L0+1/L0+1
L0/L0
> q∗L0/L0 . The average
cost function of the L0/L0 + 1-organization intersects the average cost function of
the L0 + 1/L0 + 1-organization at the output q˜
L0+1/L0+1
L0/L0+1
> q˜
L0+1/L0+1
L0/L0
.
We exploit the characteristics of the average cost function.
• AC0,0/1 ≤ AC
MES
0,0 ∀ q˜
∗
0/0 ≤ q˜ ≤ q˜
MAX ;
• AC0,0/0 is increasing for q˜ > q˜
∗
0/0;
• AC0,1/1 is decreasing for q˜ ≤ q˜
∗
1/1, where q˜
MAX ≤ q˜∗1/1;
• at q˜∗0/0, AC0,1/1 > AC0,0/0.
In consequence, the increasing average costs function of the ME firm with 0/0 below-
CEO layers AC0,0/0 intersects the decreasing average costs function of the ME firm
with 1/1 below CEO layers AC0,1/1 at a lower output than the level at which the
decreasing average cost function of the ME firm with 0/1 below-CEO layers AC0,0/1
intersects the average cost function AC0,1/1. 
C.3.6 The optimal number of layers with transport frictions, wage and
output differences
Wage differences, w1 6= w0, τ > 1, θ10 ≥ θ00 and q˜1 = q˜0.
Note: Output is on a log scale. The decrease of output in Figure C.3c compared to the
decrease in Figure C.2b is larger than the lengths of the arrows suggest.
Figure C.2: Lower wages at the establishment than at the headquarters
(a) w1 = 0.8w0, θ10 = θ00 (b) w1 = 0.8w0, θ10 ∈ {θ00, 1.25θ00}
The figure plots the average cost functions of a ME firm for w1 = 0.8w0, τ = 1.5, and q˜1 = q˜0.
Parameter values: cλ = .225, θ00 = .26 (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012), w0 = 1, q˜j ∈ [1, 63].
(a): θ10 = θ00: Due to the lower wages at the establishment, the firm adds a layer of middle
managers first only at the establishment and then also at the headquarters.
(b): θ10 ∈ {θ00, 1.25θ00}: Higher helping costs across space decrease the level of output at which
the firm adds a layer of middle managers at the establishment.
Note: for the highest values of output in Figure (a), a layer of middle managers only at the
headquarters has lower average costs than a layer only at the establishment. The reason is that a
firm with 0/1 organization shifts total production to the establishment for high values of output
and thus bears the transport costs, while it sticks to multi-establishment production with the
1/0 organization. The costs of the 0/1 organization are below those of the 1/0 organization for
even higher output.
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Figure C.3: Higher wages at the establishment than at the headquarters
(a) w1 = 1.25w0, θ10 = θ00 (b) w1 = 1.25w0, θ10 = 1.25θ00
(c) w1 = 1.25w0, θ10 ∈ {θ00, 1.25θ00}
The figure plots the average cost functions of a ME firm for w1 = 1.25w0, τ = 1.5, and q˜1 = q˜0.
Parameter values: cλ = .225, θ00 = .26 (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012), w0 = 1, q˜j ∈ [1, 63].
(a): θ10 = θ00: Due to the lower wages at the headquarters, the firm adds a layer of middle
managers first only at the headquarters and then also at the establishment.
(b): θ10 = 1.25θ00: The helping costs across space outweigh the higher wages at the establishment,
so the firm adds a layer of middle managers only at the establishment for a range of output levels.
(c): θ10 ∈ {θ00, 1.25θ00}: Higher helping costs across space decrease the level of output at which
the firm adds a layer of middle managers at the headquarters in addition to the establishment.
Note: for the highest values of output in the figure, adding a layer only at the establishment has
lower average costs than adding it only at the headquarters. As in Figure C.2a, the reason is that
the firm shifts total production to the headquarters with the 1/0 organization for high values of
output and thus bears the transport costs.
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Output differences, q˜1 6= q˜0, τ > 1, θ10 = θ00 and w1 = w0.
Figure C.4: Lower output at the establishment than at the headquarters
The figure plots the average cost functions of a ME firm for q˜1 = 0.5q˜0, w1 = w0, τ = 1.1, and
θ10 = θ00. Parameter values:
c
λ = .225, θ00 = .26 (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012), w0 = 1,∑1
j=0 q˜j ∈ [2, 126].
Helping cost and output differences, τ > 1 and w1 = w0.
Note: Output is on a log scale. The relative decrease of output in levels therefore differs
from what the relative length of the arrows suggests. In levels, the decrease of output for
an additional layer at the headquarters is half the decrease at the establishment.
Figure C.5: Simultaneous change of helping costs and output
The figure plots the minimum average cost functions of a ME firm for w1 = w0, τ = 1.1. Parameter
values: cλ = .225, θ00 = .26 (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012), w0 = 1,
∑1
j=0 q˜j ∈ [2, 126].
The dashed line assumes θ10 = θ00 and q˜1 = q˜0. The solid line assumes θ10 = 2θ00 and q˜1 = .66q˜0.
C.3.7 Comparative statics with respect to q˜j, θ10 if ξj,ω = τξk,ω, τ ≥ 1
Proposition C.1. Suppose the firm produces in the headquarters and the establishment.
Suppose either that the firm incurs transport costs τ > 1 to ship output from one location
to the other and that ξj,ω = τξk,ω, j 6= k, or that there are no transport frictions τ = 1, so
ξ0,ω = ξ1,ω, but the headquarters and the establishment are not symmetric, i.e., θ10 ≥ θ00,
and w1 < w0 or L1 6= L0. Given the organizational structure ω,
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a) CEO knowledge z¯0,ω increases with local output q˜j. Higher local output q˜j increases
the number of production workers n0k,ω at the location with the larger decrease of
the marginal production costs and decreases their number at the other location, un-
less L0 > L1 and wages w1 are too high.
b) The knowledge of the employees at all below-CEO layers zℓk,ω, ℓ ≤ Lk and the
marginal benefit of CEO time ϕk,ω, k = 0, 1, do not vary with local output q˜j.
c) The marginal production costs ξk,ω, k = 0, 1, decrease with output q˜j.
Under symmetry, i.e., τ = 1, θ10 = θ00, w1 = w0 and L1 = L0, output has the same effect
on the choices of a multi-establishment firm as in Proposition 1.
Intuition.
• If ξj,ω = τξk,ω, j 6= k, the multi-establishment firm effectively produces with two
different technologies that have the same effective marginal production costs. It
grows by recombining the technologies through reallocating CEO time and output.
• CEO knowledge increases with local output, because knowledge and labor are com-
plementary inputs. The number of production workers increases (decreases) at the
location with the larger (smaller) decrease of the marginal costs, because the firm
reallocates output to the location with the larger decrease of the marginal costs.
• The parameter values determine the optimal combination of the knowledge levels
of the employees at all below-CEO layers. The optimal combination is uniquely
given by the two conditions ϕ0,ω = ϕ1,ω and ξ0,ω = ξ1,ω. Correspondingly, neither
knowledge levels nor the marginal benefit of CEO time vary with local output.
Case 1: ξ1,ω = τξ0,ω, τ ≥ 1. The second order conditions correspond to the ones in
Appendix section C.3.3 with the following exceptions:
d2L
dq0,ωdq˜j
−
d2L
dq1,ωdq˜j
= τ
dξ0,ω
dq˜j
−
dξ1,ω
dq˜j
= 0
d2L
dφ¯0,ωdq˜0
= 1−
dq0,ω
dq˜0
− τ
dq1,ω
dq˜0
= 0
d2L
dφ¯0,ωdq˜1
= τ −
dq0,ω
dq˜1
− τ
dq1,ω
dq˜1
= 0
To show (a): CEO knowledge z¯0,ω increases with local output q˜0, q˜1 (or, if ξ0,ω =
ξ1,ω, total output q˜).
1. As will be shown below,
dϕk,ω
dq˜j
= 0 and
dzℓk,ω
dq˜j
= 0, ℓ = 0, ..., Lk.
d2L
dn0k,ωdq˜j
yields:
dξk,ω
dq˜j
= −
ξk,ωλe
−λz¯0,ω
1− e−λz¯0,ω
dz¯0,ω
dq˜j
2. From d
2L
dξk,ωdq˜j
j, k = 0, 1:
dn0k,ω
dq˜j
=
1
1− e−λz¯0,ω
(
dqk,ω
dq˜j
− n0k,ωλe
−λz¯0,ω
dz¯0,ω
dq˜j
)
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